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Abstract:  Waves of technological change explain the most important transformations of 
American tort law.  In this Article, I begin by examining historical instances of this linkage.    
Following the Industrial Revolution, for example, machines, no longer humans and animals, 
powered production.  With greater force, locomotives and other machines inflicted far more 
severe injuries.  These dramatic technological changes prompted the replacement of the 
preexisting strict liability tort standard with the negligence regime.  Similarly, later technological 
changes caused the enactment of workers’ compensation statutes, the implementation of 
automobile no-fault systems in some states and routinized automobile settlement practices in 
others that resemble a no-fault system, and the adoption of “strict” products liability.  From this 
history, I derive a model explaining how technological innovation alters (1) the frequency of 
personal injuries, (2) the severity of such injuries, (3) the difficulty of proving claims, and (4) the 
new technology’s social utility.  These four factors together determine the choice among three 
liability standards: strict liability, negligence, and no-fault liability with limited damages.  I then 
apply this model to the looming technological revolution in which autonomous vehicles, robots, 
and other Artificial Intelligence machines will replace human decision-making as well as human 
force.  I conclude that the liability system governing autonomous vehicles is likely to be one 
similar to the workers’ compensation system in which the victim is relieved of the requirement 
of proving which party acted tortiously and caused the accident.  
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Originalists find themselves strangely out of place when it comes to tort law.  The 
personal injuries that dominate tort law, the smashing of bones by automobiles and other 
powerful machines and the horrible diseases resulting from exposure to asbestos or lead-based 
paint, did not exist in the late-eighteenth century.  Not coincidentally, today’s law governing 
compensation for personal injuries would be unrecognizable to the Founders.  Moreover, 
technological change has not ended.  Instead, American society finds itself on the cusp of a 
looming technological revolution, the Information Age, that will make autonomous vehicles, 
robots, and other products incorporating artificial intelligence ubiquitous parts of everyday life.   
In this Article, I trace how successive waves of technological change in American society 
contributed to the development of law governing liability for personal injuries.  Each new wave 
of technology rips the fabric of the preexisting law governing compensation for accidental 
personal injuries.1  From this history, I derive a descriptive model that analyzes how the 
technological changes resulting from the Industrial Revolution, including the development and 
proliferation of railroads, led to the installation of the negligence regime during the mid-
nineteenth century.   
In the first decades of the twenty-first century, a model that associates technological and 
legal change is more than a matter of academic curiosity.  It assists us in predicting the future of 
the law governing personal injury claims arising from autonomous vehicles and other devices 
where the machines themselves perform the decision-making, as well as supplying the force that 
causes personal injuries.   
                                                          
1 Jack Balkin observes that “[i]nstead of saying that law is responding to essential features of new technology, it 
might be better to say that social struggles over the use of new technology are being inserted into existing features of 
law, disrupting expectations about how to categorize situations.”  Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 






Given that the staggering amounts of personal injuries in modern society that result 
almost exclusively from machines and toxic substances that did not exist before the Industrial 
Revolution, it is surprising that no other tort scholar or legal historian has comprehensively 
tracked how changes in tort law flow from technological change.2  Other legal historians and tort 
scholars, notably Morton Horwitz, Lawrence Friedman, and Gary Schwartz, have previously 
considered the role of technological change during the nineteenth century, particularly the 
emergence of railroads, as a possible cause of the development of negligence law.3  Even here, 
however, their scholarly debate of a generation ago focused more on whether the changes in law 
were intended to shift the distributional consequences of harms caused by new technologies, that 
is, which socioeconomic class would bear the economic brunt of injuries, rather than on how 
changes in technology, in and of themselves, precipitated changes in the law.  Additionally, these 
scholars left us without a comprehensive theory explaining the role played by technological 
advancements in changing tort law.  Other factors, including not only politics and ideology, but 
also race, gender, and socioeconomic considerations, obviously affect the development of tort 
law.4  However, because actionable tortious injuries almost always directly involve products of 
                                                          
2 A rich literature exists tracing the impact of technology on other aspects of tort law, such as invasion of privacy 
torts.  See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1819–21, 1826–28 
(2010) (describing the origins of the invasion of privacy torts in the technologies of the late nineteenth-century and 
advocating updates to the law to reflect modern website and database technology).  Moreover, a few scholars have 
begun to address the specific issues arising from the impact of robotics in causing physical injuries.  See, e.g., 
Balkin, supra note 1, at 45–55 (considering the interaction between robotic technologies and the law); Ryan Calo, 
Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515, 534–35 (2015) (“Robotics is shaping up to be 
the next transformative technology of our time. … A transformative technology such as … robotics matters insofar 
as it changes the range of human experiences in ways that undermine the balance the law hopes to strike”); Nora 
Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the Obstacles, 162 U PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 
(2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/162-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-35.pdf (analyzing the products liability 
issues arising from 3-D printing and stating that “[f]ollowing any significant technological breakthrough, legal 
scholars, practitioners, and policymakers must consider how the innovation meshes with—or poses challenges to—
our existing laws”).   
3 See infra notes 148–172 and accompanying text.   
4 See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT 
LAW (2010); Donald G. Gifford & Brian Jones, Keeping Cases from Black Juries: An Empirical Analysis of How 
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technology, the lack of scholarly attention to the history of technology appears initially to be a 
curious omission.  
To understand why legal scholars avoid the history of technology and its impact on the 
law, let us consider the broader scholarly realm, where the history of technology is similarly 
decidedly out of vogue.5  Technological determinism, once the dominant perspective of the 
history of technology, rested on the proposition that technological change was the cause of 
socioeconomic and political transformation.6  This perspective often morphed into an elitist 
celebration of Western civilization and its technological accomplishments.7  Leo Marx notes that 
for many historians of technology, “[t]he West’s dominant belief system, in fact, turned on the 
idea of technical innovation as a primary agent of progress.”8  This optimistic, Western-oriented 
school of technological determinism, however, became decidedly unpopular during the late-
twentieth century.  Identifying human progress as technological progress could not survive 
“Hiroshima, the nuclear arms race, the American war in Vietnam, Chernobyl, Bhopal, the Exxon 
oil spill, acid rain, global warming, [and] ozone depletion.”9  Additionally, the study of history 
(and the law) now more fully and accurately reflects the perspectives of those who had not fared 
                                                          
Race, Income Inequality and Regional History Affect Tort Law, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 617–19 (2016) 
(confirming, empirically, the effect of race on changes in tort law and evaluating the possible effects of income 
inequality).  
5 John M. Staudenmaier, Rationality versus Contingency in the History of Technology, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE 
HISTORY?: THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 259, 260–61 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx, eds., 
1994) [hereinafter “DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY?”] (observing that “the work of historians of technology is 
so often ignored in the historical mainstream”; further noting the “total absence of historians of technology” from a 
debate over the proper subjects of historical interpretation).  
6 Historians variously find the genesis of technological determinism in the work of, among others, Thorstein Veblen, 
see THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 303 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1932) (1904) (“The 
factor in the modern situation that is alien to the ancient regime is the machine technology, with its many and wide 
ramifications.”) and Karl Marx, see KARL MARX, THE POVERTY OF PHILOSOPHY 109 (Int’l Publishers Co., Inc.6th 
prtg. 1975) (1847) (“The hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill, society with the industrial 
capitalist.”).    
7 See Studenmaier, supra note 5, at 271 (noting that the traditional school of historians of technology “might suggest 
that the people who identify with Western, quantified, rational, scientific-technological progress reveal … an 
[unblushing] elitism” … They might be saying “Face it: Western science, Western practice, Western economics 
have in fact swept the opposition from the field, and the only people who really don’t get it are those who are 
illiterate of the language of the past couple of hundred years”).  
8 Leo Marx, The Idea of “Technology” and Postmodern Pessimism, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY?, supra 
note 5, at 240 (further stating that “between 1750 and 1850 … at more popular levels of culture, … progress … was 
exemplified by innovations in the familiar practical arts.”). 
9 Id. at 238.  
5 
 
as well during the post-Enlightenment technological era, such as those living in both 
underdeveloped countries and less affluent communities.10  
Ironically, the flight from the study of technology as a cause of socioeconomic change 
encompassed even ignoring technology’s role in causing unwanted and deleterious 
consequences.11  This scholarly gap is particularly germane to the study of those aspects of tort 
law governing compensation for personal injuries.  Nineteenth-century technological changes 
increased the severity of tortiously caused personal injuries.  The force and momentum of 
machines, such as locomotives, smashing into human bodies almost always inflicted far more 
severe injuries than did the accidental harms previously caused by human beings themselves and, 
in most instances, even the injuries inflicted by horses or other farm animals in an earlier era.12  
It is not surprising that this first technological revolution resulted in the most important 
transformation of tort law in American history.   
Now, American society is in the midst of a similarly important set of technological 
changes.  Autonomous vehicles, often referred to as driverless cars, and other forms of robotics 
controlled by artificial intelligence suggest that within a decade or less, much of the decision-
making that results in personal injuries to others will be in the hands of machines, not humans.13   
In the nineteenth century, machine force replaced human (and animal) force.  Similarly, during 
the early twenty-first century, the decisions controlling machines will shift from humans to the 
machines themselves.  
How will artificial intelligence and robotics change the tort law governing compensation 
for personal injuries?  How should the law governing autonomous vehicles and other machines 
                                                          
10 See Studenmaier, supra note 5 at 260 (noting the absence of technology as an appropriate topic of historical 
interpretation from a list that focused instead on racial minorities, families, and urban populations).   
11 But cf. Daniel Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U.L. REV. 61, 62 (2009) (noting that “[n]ew technologies 
generate economic progress by reducing the costs of socially productive activities … [but] often reduce the costs of 
socially destructive activities.”).  
12 See infra notes 79–92, and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 342–392, and accompanying text. 
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directed by artificial intelligence be changed?  Neither the descriptive nor the normative question 
can be intelligently analyzed without an understanding of how and why American tort law 
responded to technological change in the past.  
Informed by the history of how new technological waves affected tort law in the past, in 
this Article I present a simple descriptive model that suggests new technologies impact four 
variables that in turn alter tort law:  
(1) the frequency of personal injuries caused by the technology;  
(2) the severity of injuries caused by the new technology;  
(3) the level of difficulty in proving liability; and  
(4) the social utility of the new technology.  
My focus here, with one exception, is how technology induces changes in the formal, 
articulated law of torts.  I recognize that throughout the history of American tort law, novel 
technologies sometimes caused swells of tortiously-caused harms that were resolved through 
aggregate settlement procedures between “repeat players”14  who often applied rules of thumb to 
both liability and damages issues that sometimes deviated from the formal, articulated rules of 
torts.15  I do describe the single example of how the settlement of routine automobile accident 
claims during recent decades, even in states that did not adopt formal no-fault systems, often 
echoes such an approach by awarding damages to injured claimants despite the fact that the strict 
application of the law of torts might suggest a different result and by valuing the damages 
awarded in a formulaic manner.16  Further, the scope of this Article is limited to the substantive 
issues of whether fault is required for liability and whether the claimant is able to recover the full 
measure of common-law damages or instead if recoverable damages are limited to economic 
losses or some portion thereof.  I do not, for example, consider how new technologies led to 
                                                          
14 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.  
15 See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of 
American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1588 (2004) (reporting that “such standardized claims practices … 
tended to depart from what the formal law of torts might have provided in any individual case.”).   
16 See infra notes 265–278, and accompanying text. 
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innovative doctrines governing factual causation in mass product torts, such as market share 
liability.17  
In Part I, I briefly describe technology in pre-industrial America and analyze why claims 
seeking compensation for personal injury were so rare even though most scholars conclude that 
the prevailing standard of liability was one of strict liability.  There are few records of accidental 
injuries and claims for compensation, but what is known about technology and the law during 
this era enables me to offer a credible explanation for what occurred.  
In Part II, I turn my attention to the mid-nineteenth century, the time of both the 
Industrial Revolution (especially the development of railroad networks), and the most dramatic 
transformation in the history of American tort law: the change from the ex-ante strict liability 
standard to the classical negligence regime.  I examine the various competing explanations 
previously offered by legal historians and scholars to explain the change in liability standards.  I 
conclude that technology in and of itself, rather than the class-based distributional consequences 
identified by Morton Horwitz and Lawrence Friedman, lay at the heart of the critical 
transformation from strict liability to negligence.18  Using the technology-caused factors 
affecting liability standards previously identified, I find that the most important factors causing 
the change were the increased aggregate liability facing railroads and other industries, caused 
largely by the increased severity of injuries resulting from the proliferation of new machinery, 
and the perceived social utility of new technologies.  I also describe how other factors that legal 
historians and scholars identify as alternative explanations for either the increase in the 
                                                          
17 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab, 607 P.2d 924, 937 (Cal. 1980) (holding each DES-manufacturer liable for the 
portion of damages equivalent to its share of the relevant market for its product when plaintiff is unable to identify 
the particular defendant that manufactured the product causing her harm).  
18 See infra notes 190-202, and accompanying text. 
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frequency of claims19 or the emergence of the negligence regime20 are more accurately 
interpreted as secondary consequences of technological change. 
In Part III, I describe three sets of legal changes that I attribute to the “aftershocks” of the 
Industrial Revolution.  First, the proliferation of factories, which required the development of 
both railroad networks and industrial machinery, played an important role in the enactment of 
state workers’ compensation statutes.21  Second, the proliferation of automobiles and the 
accidents they caused led to the formal adoption of no-fault compensation systems in a minority 
of states and routinized claims processing that sometimes resembled a no-fault system in other 
states.22  Third, mass production factories combined with modern transportation systems to yield 
the mass consumer society, which, I argue, led in turn to the development of “strict” products 
liability.23  
Part IV briefly outlines a descriptive model derived from the previous history and 
analysis, explaining the four variables that connect the technological advances to changes in 
substantive tort law.  These variables include the frequency of personal injuries caused by the 
new wave of technology, the severity of those resulting injuries, the degree of difficulty victims 
face in proving their claims, and the social utility of the technological advances.   I then test the 
model by applying it to past waves of technological change.  
Part V looks to the future and anticipates the changes in accident compensation law likely 
to result from the imminent technological revolution in which decision-making by machines will 
control the force that causes personal injuries.  I argue that technological advances, including 
                                                          
19 See infra notes 95–125, 187, and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 173–189, and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 207–230, and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 231–278, and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 279–330, and accompanying text. 
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robotics, artificial intelligence, and particularly autonomous vehicles, will lead to the most 
important changes in American tort law since those of the mid-nineteenth century.  
I then briefly conclude. 
I.  Accidents and Claims in Pre-industrial America  
 
Pre-industrial America was a different world.  In this Part, I begin by describing the 
paucity of significant accidental injuries that occurred in America before 1820.24  I then consider 
why even when accidental injuries did occur, they seldom led to legal claims for compensation.25  
Finally, in those rare instances in which a claim reached court, I argue that the meager evidence 
suggests that the prevailing liability standard was one of strict liability.26 
A. Personal Injury Accidents in Pre-Industrial America 
 
Remarkably little is known about either accidental injuries in the United States before the 
mid-nineteenth century or claims for compensation resulting from such injuries.  In later eras, the 
accidental harms that led to tort claims were most often caused by machinery.27  Carroll Pursell, 
a leading scholar of the history of technology, describes the technology that Europeans brought 
to the United States in the seventeenth century as “primarily a handicraft technology.”28  Pursell 
notes that “[m]ost tools were hand tools … made of wood.”29  Well into the nineteenth century, 
the economy was almost exclusively an agrarian one, and machines were “the traditional tools of 
farming: the hoes, spades, scythes, reaping hooks, shovels, carts, harrows, and plows.”30  Human 
                                                          
24 See infra notes 27–34, and accompanying text.  
25 See infra notes 35–54, and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 55–64, and accompanying text. 
27 See MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 99 (2d ed. 1990) 
(observing that “industrialization changed the way goods were produced … . [M]achines … replaced handicraft 
labor”).  
28 CARROLL PURSELL, THE MACHINE IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICA 10 (2d ed. 2007); see also 
BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 27, at 98 (reporting that “[b]efore the Industrial Revolution, men and women made 
yarn and cloth at home, with simple, hand-powered machinery”).  
29 PURSELL, supra note 28, at 10. 
30 Id. at 14.  
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beings provided both the force that operated the tools and the decision-making that directed their 
use. 
Accidental injuries no doubt occurred prior to the mid-nineteenth century, but we can 
only speculate as to how often they occurred.  No government agency or insurance actuary 
contemporaneously compiled records of such accidents, but as any home-handyperson knows, 
even simple manual tools such as hammers, sometimes cause injuries.31  The bulk of accidents 
during the preindustrial era involved a single person and sometimes family members or close 
friends.32  As such, these accidents were decidedly different than their twenty-first-century 
analogs, which are perhaps best exemplified by random automobile accidents between strangers 
commuting on a Los Angeles expressway.   
The earliest American legal opinions involving claims for personal injuries, issued 
between 1810 and 1840, describe a handful of examples of the subset of early accidental 
personal injuries where someone other than the victim or a family member can plausibly be 
asserted to have caused the accident.  These accidents disproportionately involved injuries 
arising from transportation, still the most common source of tortious injuries.33  The injuries 
                                                          
31 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 592–93 n.166 (1985) (noting that 
most personal injuries occur in the household and do not result in filed claims). 
32 See JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE 
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW 52–53 (2004) (reporting that “[d]uring the 1820s and 1830s, the shape of economic 
life in the North underwent a critical shift … . New mills and factories … separated production from the sphere of 
domestic life”); Kenneth S Abraham, The Common Law Prohibition on Party Testimony and the Development of 
Tort Liability, 95 VA. L. REV. 489, 498 (2009) (noting that “parties involved in accidents on family farms would  
typically have been close relatives, against whom suit would either have been economically pointless or barred by 
intrafamily immunity rules.”); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A 
Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1734 (1981) [hereinafter Tort Law and the Economy] (observing that “[i]n 
1790, … the vast majority of Americans lived and worked on family farms.  In the urban towns, simple products 
were fabricated by artisans”) (footnote omitted).  
33 See THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 206240, TORT TRIALS AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 
2001, at 2 tbl.1 (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ttvlc01.pdf (showing that 53.3% of all tort trials in 
2001 were automobile related; premises liability cases were a distant second at 16%).  Morton Horwitz refers to 
“collision cases” as “the first to involve joint actors.”  MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860, 88, 95–96 (1977).  A random sampling of written legal opinions in cases involving accidental 
personal injuries from this era includes injuries sustained by a stage-coach passenger when the negligent driver 
overturned the coach, Stokes v. Saltonstall, 38 U.S. 181, 190 (1839) (affirming judgment of liability); Ware v. Gay, 
(11 Pick.) 106, 112 (1831) (regarding personal injury caused by negligently maintained stagecoach); Lane v. 
Crombie, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 177, 178 (1831) (regarding four-horse sleigh running over plaintiff); Ford v. Monroe, 
11 
 
caused by these accidents, however, were likely distinguishable in important ways from those 
occurring even a half-century later.  First, while it is only possible to speculate about the 
frequency of such accidental injuries, most were likely not as severe as injuries sustained in the 
late nineteenth and the twentieth century. The force or power that propelled the objects that 
impacted the victim’s body and inflicted these injuries were either human or animal.  In either 
event, they lacked the magnitude of force of the instrumentalities that would later inflict most 
accidental injuries, such as coal-fired steam locomotives or gasoline-powered automobiles.  
Second, the human beings that accidentally inflicted the injuries in most instances were probably 
either the victim himself or family members or friends of the victim.  They were not anonymous 
employees of large industrial enterprises that had access to significant resources to pay for the 
costs of the accidental injuries they had inflicted.34 
B. The Paucity of Personal Injury Claims in Pre-Industrial America 
 
Even when a victim experienced a personal injury of significant severity during the pre-
industrial period in the United States, it was unlikely that such injury would result in a legal 
claim seeking compensation.  Legal historian John Fabian Witt observes that “[e]ighteenth-
century lawyers and judges in England and in the American colonies paid little attention to the 
problem of unintentional injury.”35  Several reasons explain this.  First, as previously mentioned, 
the injurer often was a family member or a close friend.36  Most often, such individuals did not 
themselves possess the resources to make them attractive targets for claims seeking 
compensation.  Corporations and other large-scale commercial enterprises, the “target 
                                                          
20 Wend. 210, 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1837) (driving a gig negligently resulted in death of a child), and those sustained 
by a driver when his horse and wagon fell through an opening of a bridge. See Shepherd v. Lincoln, 17 Wend. 250, 
252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (affirming judgment of liability); cf. also, Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411, 419 (1837) (holding 
defendant town liable for insufficiently maintained road that caused wagon to overturn). 
34 See infra notes 95–99, and accompanying text. 
35 WITT, supra note 32, at 6. 
36 See supra notes 32, 34, and accompanying text.   
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defendants”37 of later times, were rare.38  Further, it was not until the late nineteenth century that 
liability insurance became available in the United States.39  Indeed, liability insurance was 
believed to be against public policy, because it contributed to moral hazard by freeing a 
tortfeasor from the financial consequences of its tortious harms.40 
The second reason that claims for personal injuries were rare was the witness 
disqualification rule.41  Unbelievable as it may seem today, until the 1840s or later, the injured 
plaintiff and any other witnesses with an interest in the outcome, such as husbands and wives, 
were prohibited from testifying in court because of the witness disqualification rule.42  
Obviously, this rule made it difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to find a witness to testify on 
her behalf in simple collision or workplace injury cases.43 The rule often posed less of a 
disadvantage to the defendant because in many cases the defendant was an entity such as a 
stagecoach or other transportation company.  In this situation, many states interpreted the rule to 
allow the employees of the defendant to testify, even if the defendant itself would not have been 
able to do so.44  Further, plaintiffs were unable to testify about the damages that they were 
                                                          
37 See Cornelius J. Peck, Washington’s Partial Rejection and Modification of the Common Law Rule of Joint and 
Several Liability, 62 WASH. L. REV. 233, 238 (1987) (defining target defendants as tortfeasors selected as 
defendants based on their “financial responsibility and ability to pay. . .”). 
38 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 129 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that most corporations in 
the colonial period “were churches, charities, or cities or boroughs”).  
39 See Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 86 (2001) 
(“Until the second half of the nineteenth century, liability insurance would have been considered against public 
policy.”). 
40 Id.  
41 See Kenneth S. Abraham, supra note 32, at 490 (reporting that “between about 1600 and 1850, neither the 
plaintiff nor the defendant in a tort suit could testify in that suit”); Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, The 
Transformation of the Civil Trial and the Emergence of American Tort Law, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 431, 448–52 (2017) 
(describing the rule and its impact). 
42 See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 457–61 (describing repeal of the rule in various jurisdictions beginning 
in the 1840s and continuing until the 1890s); John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of American Accident Law: 
Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 753–54 
(describing the party disqualification rules and their origins).  
43 See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 433 (finding that “[f]ar fewer tort actions were brought at all, because 
often the only evidence available to the plaintiff was his or her own account of what had happened, and that was 
inadmissible.”). 
44 Id. at 462. 
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uniquely able to testify about, such as pain and suffering.45  The net effect was to reduce the 
plaintiff’s incentive to pursue litigation.  
A third obstacle to bringing a personal injury claim in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century was that the new American states had adopted the then-contemporary common law of 
England with its intricate pleading requirements.46  Under the writ system, if a claimant’s 
attorney chose the wrong cause of action, his claim would be dismissed with prejudice.47  In 
personal injury cases, the plaintiff’s attorney’s choice was typically between “trespass” or 
“trespass vi et armis” for immediate harms and “trespass on the case” for consequential harms.48  
Leame v. Bray,49 a contemporaneous English case, illustrates a typical accident of the time and 
the intricacies of the trespass-case distinction.  The defendant negligently drove his horse-drawn 
carriage into the plaintiff’s carriage, causing plaintiff’s driver to be thrown to the ground, the 
horses to run away with the plaintiff’s carriage, and the plaintiff to jump for his life, fracturing 
his collarbone.  The defendant contended that the injury was “consequential and not immediately 
flowing from the forcible act of the defendant” and therefore, the only proper remedy was an 
action for trespass on the case.50  The court, however, held that trespass was the proper tort 
because the defendant’s application of force lead to a continuous set of activities that resulted in 
the plaintiff’s injury.51  As one might imagine, the not-always-obvious application of these 
technical pleading requirements to cases involving accidental injury discouraged many attorneys 
from handling personal injury claims.  
                                                          
45 Id. at 470–71.  
46 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 28. See also, e.g., MD. CONST. DECL. RIGHTS art. 5 (guaranteeing “[t]hat the 
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England”).    
47 See JOSEPH H. KOFFLER & ALISON REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON LAW PLEADING 434, 474 (1969) (explaining 
common law pleading).  
48 See Leame v. Bray, 3 East 593, 593, 102 Eng. Rep. 72, 724–25 (K.B. 1803) (stating that “where the injury is 
immediate on the act done, there trespass lies; but where it is not immediate on the act done, but consequential, there 
the remedy is in case.”).  
49 Id.  
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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Finally, the contingent fee agreement, which today is the virtually universal means of 
compensating plaintiff’s attorneys in personal injury cases was most often regarded as 
champerty,52 and therefore illegal, during the early decades of the nineteenth century.53  Then, as 
now, it is likely that few victims of personal injuries could afford the fees charged by plaintiff’s 
attorneys out of their own pockets.  By the late-nineteenth century, contingent fee agreements 
were widely viewed as legitimate, though still controversial.54  
In summary, prior to the mid-nineteenth century, even when a victim sustained a serious, 
tortiously inflicted injury, a number of factors precluded the filing of claims in the vast majority 
of cases.  These factors included the absence of liability insurance or defendants with sufficient 
resources to adequately compensate the victim, the complexity of common law pleading rules, 
the witness disqualification rule, and the prohibition of contingent fee agreements.  
 
C. The Strict Liability Standard in the Law of the Pre-Industrial Era 
 
Modern tort law often begins with the issue of whether liability for a personal injury is to 
be determined under a fault-based (negligence) standard or a no-fault (strict liability) standard.55  
Until the mid-nineteenth century, however, judges, scholars, and lawyers simply did not evaluate 
potential liability in those terms.  As described in the previous part, accidental personal injuries, 
particularly those between strangers, were rare.56  Even more unusual were legal claims for those 
injuries.57  When such claims were pursued, the focus of substantive law was on whether the 
                                                          
52 See Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of Contingency Fee 
Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231, 232 n.3 (1998) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 292 (4th 
ed. 1968)) (defining champerty as “[a] bargain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person 
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own cost and risk, in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of the 
proceeds or subject sought to be recovered.”).  
53 See, e.g., Arden v. Patterson, 5 Johns. Ch. 44, 48 (N.Y. Ch. 1821) (Kent, Ch.) (stating that “[t]he purchase of a 
lawsuit by an attorney … is champerty in its most odious form; and it ought equally to be condemned on principles 
of public policy.”); see also Karsten, supra note 52, at 233–48 (1998) 
54 See Karsten, supra note 52, at 248–50.  
55 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability, 
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2014) (stating that “[n]o topic has received more attention in modern torts scholarship 
than the distinction between strict liability and fault-based liability.”).  
56 See supra notes 27–31, and accompanying text.  
57 See supra notes 35–54, and accompanying text. 
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claim should have been filed under the writ of trespass or the writ of trespass on the case, not 
whether the governing substantive law required proof of fault on the defendant’s part.58  In short, 
characterizing the law governing personal injuries in the pre-Industrial Revolution era through 
the lens of later American tort law is fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty.59  
Having acknowledged these challenges, most legal historians agree that the negligence 
regime that governed American tort law did not emerge until the mid-nineteenth century. 
Horwitz concludes that “[a]t the beginning of the nineteenth century there was a general private 
law presumption in favor of compensation, expressed by the oft-cited common law maxim sic 
utere.”60  This strict or no-fault liability standard characterized the common law of England,61  
which the American states continued to follow even after separation from the mother country.62 
Horwitz argues that American common law decisions prior to the 1830s using the term 
“negligence” referred to cases involving the defendant’s violation of a specific duty imposed by 
contract, ordinance, or statute, not an obligation to use reasonable care to prevent harm 
                                                          
58 See supra notes 46–51, and accompanying text. 
59 See Robert L. Rabin, The Historical Development of the Fault Principle: A Reinterpretation, 15 GA. L. REV. 925, 
925–26 (1981) (arguing that “[l]egal historians have … scrutinize[ed] the cryptic opinions for traces of a ‘fault’ 
requirement in the early law of personal harms … [but] the issue remains in doubt.”) 
60 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 85; see also Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 
VA. L. REV. 359, 370–72 (1951) (noting the presence of “liability for unintentionally caused harm” absent 
negligence).  
61 See, e.g., Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284, 284, Hobart 134, 135 (K. B, 1616) (stating that tort liability “tends 
to give damages according to hurt or loss … except that it may be judged utterly without fault”); further explaining 
that the exception applies in narrow circumstances, e.g., “if a man by force take my hand and strike you, or … that 
the plaintiff ran across his piece when he was discharging, or had set forth … circumstances, so as it had appeared to 
the Court that it had been inevitable”).   Similarly, in The Case of the Thorns, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, pl. 18 (K.B. 
1466), J. Brian stated in dicta:  
 
And so if a man makes an assault upon me and I cannot avoid him, and he wants to beat me, and I in 
defence of myself raise my stick and strike him, and in raising it I hurt some man who is behind my 
back, this man will have an action against me. And yet it was lawful for me to raise my stick to 
defend myself, and it was against my will that I hurt him.  
 
reprinted in COURTNEY STANHOPE KENNY, A SELECTION OF CASES ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORT 
379, 380–81 (1904).  See also generally JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 
60–64, 402–05 (4th ed. 2002) (describing the English writ system); S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE COMMON LAW 295–313 (2d ed. 1981) (describing the differences between trespass and trespass on the case).  
62 See, e.g., MD. CONST. DECL. RIGHTS art. 5 (providing “[t]hat the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the 
Common Law of England … as existed on July 4, 1776”); N.Y. CONST. art. XXXV (1777) (providing “that such 
parts of the common law of England … and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did 
form the law of the said colony on the April 19, 1775, shall be and continue the law of this State”).  
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generally.63  Legal historian Lawrence Friedman largely agrees with Horwitz’s interpretation that 
the negligence standard governing personal injury cases did not arise until the mid-nineteenth 
century:  
All in all, tort law was not a highly developed field in 1776, or for a good many 
years thereafter.  Not a single treatise on the law of torts was published before 
1850, on either side of the Atlantic.  Negligence was the merest dot on the law. …  
Existing tort law was simply not designed to deal with collision, derailments, 
exploding boilers, and similar calamities.  … American law had to work out on its 
own schemes to distribute the burden of railroad and steamboat accidents … Tort 
law was new law in the nineteenth century.64 
 
In summary, until the mid-nineteenth century, the best evidence is that liability for 
personal injury accidents was governed by a no-fault or strict liability standard.  In spite of this, 
the aggregate liability of American businesses was extremely modest because the accidental 
injuries that did occur were not severe in most cases, and even serious injuries usually did not 
lead to legal claims for compensation.  
 
II.  The First American Technological Revolution and the Development of   
      Negligence 
 
New technologies profoundly changed the everyday life of many Americans during the 
nineteenth century.65  In the process, these technological changes altered both how personal 
injuries were inflicted and the severity of these injuries.66  Simultaneously, the manner in which 
the legal system handled claims for compensation for such injuries, including both the 
                                                          
63 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 86–88. Gary Schwartz subsequently challenged several aspects of Horwitz’s 
understanding of the development of negligence law during the mid-nineteenth century, including his contention that 
during the mid-nineteenth century, American tort law moved from a predominantly a no-fault or strict liability 
regime to one requiring negligence for liability.  Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy, supra note 32, at 1727–34.  
However, Schwartz later acknowledged that even his own historical account demonstrated that by the mid-
nineteenth century, “the negligence term … shed its turn-of-the-century ambiguity and … acquired its status as a 
formal legal category.”  Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 644, 
678 (1989) [hereinafter The Character of Early American Tort Law] (acknowledging that “I am now inclined to 
avoid sweeping statements on the question of novelty versus evolution.”). 
64 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 222–23.  
65 See infra notes 75–81, 88–90, and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 82, 91–92, and accompanying text. 
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substantive principles of tort law governing such claims67 and the process for handling such 
claims,68 were radically transformed.  In this part, I explore the relationship between these 
technological and legal changes and consider whether the first was a cause of the second.69  
A. The Industrial Revolution, Railroads, and the Resulting Human Carnage 
 
In the century following American independence, citizens of the new republic typically 
greeted the Industrial Revolution and the technological changes it brought with considerable 
enthusiasm.70  Tenche Cox, an assistant of Alexander Hamilton’s at the Department of Treasury 
described manufacturing technology as “the means of our POLITICAL SALVATION.”71  By the 
early decades of the nineteenth century, most political leaders and journals lauded “the progress 
of the age.”72  Merritt Roe Smith, a leading historian of technology, writes, “Decade by decade 
the pace of technological change quickened—railroads, steamships, machine tools, telegraphy, 
structures of iron and steel, electricity—and with each decade the popular enthusiasm for “men 
of progress” and for their inventions grew.”73  There was, however, a darker side to this 
unprecedented expansion of technology and industry.  Witt writes that “[i]n the second half of 
the nineteenth century, the United States experienced an accident crisis like none the world had 
ever seen.”74   
The process of mechanizing industrial processes in the United States began in the 
second-half of the eighteenth century in textile mills75 and within two decades later in 
                                                          
67 See infra notes 125–147, and accompanying text. 
68 See infra notes 107–124, and accompanying text. 
69 See infra notes 190–202, and accompanying text. 
70 See Merritt Roe Smith, Technological Determinism in American Culture, in DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE 
HISTORY?, supra note 5, at 2–13 (describing the identification of progress with technology in nineteenth-century 
America).  
71 Tench Coxe, An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures, Convened for the Purpose of 
Establishing a Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Use Arts, Lecture at the University of 
Pennsylvania (Aug. 9, 1787), reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF MANUFACTURES: EARLY DEBATES OVER 
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 61–62 (M. B. Folsom & S. D. Lubar eds., 1982) 
72 Smith, supra note 70, at 5.  
73 Id.   
74 See Witt, supra note 42, at 694.  
75 See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 37–50 (describing the mechanization of the making of textiles); Schwartz, Tort 
Law and the Economy, supra note 32, at 1737 (describing the expansion of textile factories).   
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ironworks.76  As Witt notes, however, “mills did not present … the same dangers as the 
railroads and the mines” later would.77 
Lewis Mumford, a preeminent social historian of technology, later described the 
Industrial Revolution as a transition from the “eotechnic” era, characterized by wood, water, and 
handicrafts, to a new “paleotechnic” world of steam, iron, and factories.78  He wrote that “[t]he 
specific triumph of the technical imagination rested on the ability to dissociate lifting power from 
the arm and create a crane … [and] to dissociate work from the action of men and animals and 
create the water-mill … .”79  In textile production, the technological change was one from hand-
powered looms to those powered by water.  Although the severity of injuries to workers in textile 
mills was not nearly as great as in some other nineteenth century industries, notably railroads and 
mining, 63 percent of the injuries occurring in textile mills in Massachusetts were caused by 
moving machinery and elevators.80  In the production of iron, the source of power soon shifted 
from water power to steam power and blast furnaces that used hot air produced by the burning of 
coal to heat the air injected into the hearth.81  In other words, with these technological advances, 
it was machines, and no longer humans or animals, that supplied the force or the intense heat that 
caused injuries to human beings.  The force typically was much greater than that supplied during 
the pre-industrial era by humans and animals and, as a result, the severity of the injury was likely 
to be much greater.   
                                                          
76 See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 50–63 (describing the mechanization of iron-making).  
77 WITT, supra note 32, at 54–55.  
78 LEWIS MUMFORD, TECHNICS AND CIVILIZATION 151 (First Harbinger Books Edition 1963).  See also BLACKFORD 
& KERR, supra note 27, at 99 (identifying the fact that “new sources of power gained importance in the production 
process” as a key aspect of industrialization).  
79 MUMFORD, supra note 78, at 33; see also ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON & ANDREW MCAFEE, THE SECOND MACHINE AGE: 
WORK, PROGRESS, AND PROSPERITY IN A TIME OF BRILLIANT TECHNOLOGIES 6–7 (2014) (observing that “[t]he 
Industrial Revolution … allowed us to overcome the limitations of muscle power, human and animal, and generate 
massive amounts of useful energy”).  
80 See WITT, supra note 32, at 27.  
81 See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 55–56, 63.  
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The mechanization of transportation, initially with steam-powered river boats and later, 
more prominently, with railroad locomotives, led to a dramatic explosion of accidental injuries. 
By 1850, 520 steamboats had been destroyed in accidents on American rivers, many due to 
steam-boiler explosions.82  These explosions and other accidents killed many individuals on and 
around the boats.83  The destructive impact of railroad steam locomotives, because of both their 
weight and force and the coal or wood-fueled fires that powered them, was even greater.  The 
numbers of work-related injuries and deaths among railroads employees were simply 
staggering.84  Additionally, railroad passengers,85 those riding in horse-drawn vehicles that 
collided with trains, and individuals who walked alongside the tracks, frequently children, were 
often killed or severely injured.86  By the decade of the 1890s, approximately six-thousand 
people died annually from railroad accidents, and an additional forty thousand were injured.87  
The creation of the vast railroad network in the United States in turn facilitated the 
development of factories (manufacturing plants).88  Railroads hauled coal and other raw 
materials to the plants, and delivered their products to distant locations.89  Both the mining of 
coal and other minerals, and the manufacturing process itself became highly mechanized.90  As 
was the case with railroads, the constant interaction of workers, frequently women and children, 
with machinery in factories and mines caused the rates of death and serious injuries to skyrocket.  
                                                          
82 See id. at 77–78.  
83 Id.  
84 See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 213 (2001) (noting that “[w]ork on railroads in the 
nineteenth century was extremely perilous.  Rail workers ran a high risk of death or loss of limbs”); WITT, supra 
note 32, at 27 (reporting that in 1890, the death rate among railroad workers was 314 deaths per 100,000 workers; 
death rates among certain types of railroad workers were approximately three or four times as great).  
85 ELY, supra note 84, at 219.  
86 Id. at 221.  
87 Id. at 211.  
88 See BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 27, at 163 (observing that “[t]he creation of a national market through 
improvements in transportation and communication revolutionized the marketing and distribution of goods”); 
DAVID R. MEYER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 156 (2003) (stating that “[r]ailroads offered 
forward linkages to industry by providing transport services; railroads could stimulate factory growth along rail lines 
. . . .”).  
89 Id. at 155–56; ELY, supra note 84, at 229–31.   
90 See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 163–69. 
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As an extreme example, Witt reports that “in the anthracite coal mines of Pennsylvania, … each 
year during the 1850s and 1860s, six percent of the workforce was killed, six percent 
permanently crippled, and six percent seriously but temporarily disabled.”91  More generally, 
during the last half of the nineteenth century, accidental death rates nearly doubled.92 
B. The Burgeoning Frequency of Personal Injury Claims 
 
As previously stated, few if any records exist that would allow scholars to quantify the 
frequency of personal injury claims in the early nineteenth century.93  It seems likely, however, 
that the number of claims increased significantly.94  In this part, I evaluate four factors that 
contributed to increasing the proportion of personal injury accidents caused by other parties that 
resulted in claims for compensation.  
1. The Emergence of Large Business Enterprises 
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, railroads and manufacturing firms had begun to 
emerge as the first large, modern corporations.95  By the last decades of the century, employers 
were large, bureaucratized corporations, and no longer firms and farms run by family members 
                                                          
91 See WITT, supra note 32, at 3.  
92 Id. at 26.  
93 See supra note 31, and accompanying text.   
94 Between 1820 and 1825, personal injury cases were few and far between even in developed states such as New 
York, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Gourley v. M’Allister, 5 Cow. 644 (N.Y. 1825); Lewis v. Babcock, 
18 Johns. 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821); and Overseers of Poor v. Bunn, 12 Serg. & Rawle 292 (Pa. 1825) for examples 
of the scant number of opinions addressing issues in personal injury cases during the 1820s.  However, between 
1890 and 1896, personal injury cases dominated the civil dockets in these states, with hundreds of cases related to 
injuries associated with the railroad industry.  See, e.g., Donovan v. Hartford St. Ry. Co., 65 Conn. 201 (1894) 
(seeking recovery from railway company for injuries sustained when plaintiff was struck by a railway car); 
Birmingham v. Rochester City & Brighton R.R. Co., 137 N.Y. 13 (1893) (pursuing personal injury action against a 
railway for a defect in the railway that injured plaintiff); Wood v. Pa. R. Co., 177 Pa. 306 (1896) (seeking recovery 
for personal injury sustained when a woman was killed by a train and plaintiff was struck by the corpse while 
waiting on the platform).  
95 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 11, 13 
(rev. ed. 1967) (1932) (stating that “the entrance” of the corporate enterprise “into the field of industry … dates from 
the early Nineteenth Century”; further noting the evolving use of the corporate form in the textile and railroad 
industries during the ante-bellum period).  See also JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS 
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 17 (1970) (reporting that while two-thirds of 
special corporate charters in the last decades of the eighteenth century were concerned with transportation, that 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, more than forty percent of corporate charters in New Jersey and 
Wisconsin were for manufacturing and other business purposes).  
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or close friends.96  Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, in their foundational work on the American 
corporation, remark on the “mere size” and the “tremendous aggregations of property” that 
resulted from the emergence of the corporate structure.97  A corporate firm’s capital and  
accumulated profits thus provided a ready fountain of compensation for injured employees.98  In 
addition, personal injury victims who had been reluctant to file claims against their employers, 
usually family members of close friends, 99 experienced little hesitation in seeking compensation 
from faceless corporations.  In short, the transition away from family-run and other small 
businesses to large corporations both provided an incentive for an injured employee or other 
victim to sue and eliminated a disincentive to sue.    
2. Liability Insurance 
 
Today, a very large percentage of the liabilities incurred by both corporations and 
individuals are paid by their liability insurers.100  However, for all intents and purposes, liability 
insurance was not invented until the late nineteenth century.101  By the middle of the century, 
marine and fire insurance policies often covered first-party property damage claims.102  Whether 
such policies covered harms to third-persons injured by the policyholder, however, had been 
                                                          
96 See GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS 1860-1920, at 21–23 (2d ed. 1992) (observing that “[a]s large 
corporations began to build the elaborate bureaucracies necessary for their existence, … business bean to lose its 
highly personal tone.”); WITT, supra note 32, at 52–53 (noting the critical shift in production in the northern United 
States from the domestic sphere to large mills and factories).  
97 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 95, at 6; see also HURST, supra note 95, at 26 (stating that “the corporate form 
encouraged the muster or retention of resources by offering investors an assured frame of limited commitments”). 
98 See BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 27, at 152–53 (reporting that “[b]y the 1850s, individual railroads had 
become the biggest business of the day. … [T]he trunk-line railroads connecting the East with the Midwest were 
capitalized at from $17 million to $35 million each. … Railroads continued to grow in size … after the Civil War.”);  
PORTER, supra note 96, at 33 (noting that by 1860, “numerous railroad companies had capital accounts of more than 
ten million dollars”); see generally Citron, supra note 11, at 114 (observing that “technological advances have 
created large, successful business entities … that [t]hose harmed by new technologies see … as fitting sources of 
compensation for their injuries”).  
99 See supra note 32, and accompanying text.  
100 See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Tort Liability Litigation Costs for Commercial Claims, 9 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 330, 339, 360, 362 (2007). 
101 See Kenneth S. Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention: The Evolution of an Idea, 64 MD. L. REV. 
573, 580 (2005) (stating that “[l]iability insurance was first marketed in the United States in the 1880s.”).  
102 Id. at 576. 
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debated and litigated for decades.103  On one hand, marine insurance sometimes covered liability 
for collisions with other ships.104  It was here where  insurance was for the first time understood 
as a pooling of the more or less inevitable risks of causing harm to others as a result of 
conducting one’s business.105  On the other hand, the validity of liability insurance policies was 
questioned on the grounds that insuring against the consequences of negligence would lessen the 
deterrent effect of tort liability.106   
It was not until the last decades of the nineteenth century that insurance for personal 
injuries began, initially in the form of first-party cooperative workingmen’s insurance 
associations, often sponsored by trade unions.107  Commercial liability insurance, in the form of 
“employer’s liability insurance[,] was first marketed … in the 1880s and designed to protect 
employers” from liability for claims filed by workers.108  Within a few years, policies such as 
these were expanded to cover liabilities owed to third parties other than the policyholder’s 
employees.109  
3. The Abolition of the Witness Disqualification Rule 
 
As previously described,110 the witness disqualification rule was one of the factors 
that made it more difficult for plaintiffs to recover for personal injury claims before the mid-
nineteenth century.  Kenneth Abraham and G. Edward White report that beginning in 1848, 
states began to repeal the witness disqualification rule, and thirty-one states would do so by the 
1880s.111 
                                                          
103 Id. at 576–85. 
104 Id. at 579. 
105 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 229. 
106 See Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention, supra note 101, at 580–85; see also HORWITZ, supra 
note 33, at 230.  
107 See WITT, supra note 32, at 76–84.  
108 See Abraham, Liability Insurance and Accident Prevention, supra note 101, at 580.  
109 See Abraham, The Rise and Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, supra note 39, at 87; Raymond N. Caverly, 
The Background of the Casualty and Bonding Business in the United States, INS. COUNS. J., Oct. 1939, at 62, 63–64. 
110 See supra notes 41–45, and accompanying text.  
111 See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 460.  
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The repeal of the party disqualification rule made it both more likely that injured parties 
would sue tortfeasors and more likely that they would recover.  Abraham and White appear to 
offer the witness disqualification rule as an alternative explanation112 for the thesis expounded in 
this Part of the Article that modern negligence law replaced an earlier strict liability regime 
because courts realized that application of the law governing accident compensation ex ante 
would have impeded progress in the development of industry and transportation networks in the 
United States.113  Ultimately, however, they refrain from making this outright claim, and instead 
assert that the witness disqualification rule delayed the change from strict liability to negligence 
law for several decades after industrialization and the proliferation of railroads.114  Abraham and 
White’s thesis, while convincing, does not refute the conclusion that over the long term, it was 
the onslaught of personal injury claims resulting from the Industrial Revolution that 
fundamentally transformed the law governing such claims from a strict liability standard to one 
based on negligence.115 
4. The Emergence of the First-Generation Specialized Personal Injury Bar 
 
The final factor contributing to the growth of personal injury law during the last half of 
the nineteenth century was the emergence of a group of attorneys specializing in the 
representation of personal injury claimants.  As noted previously, in the early nineteenth century, 
courts almost always regarded the use of contingent fee arrangements by personal injury 
attorneys as unlawful.116  By the middle of the century, however, legislatures and courts in most 
                                                          
112 Id. at 436–37 (stating “that the proliferation of bodily injury cases that emerged … in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century … was connected to the emergence … of industrial enterprises, mines, railroads, and trolleys … 
is inadequate”).   
113 See infra notes 190–202, and accompanying text.  
114 See Abraham & White, supra note 41, at 475 (concluding that “the major spike in bodily injury claims did not 
take place contemporaneously with the growth of railroad networks, or even with the emergence of streetcar lines.  
It began to occur approximately one or two decades after railroads and streetcars had become the dominant modes of 
urban transportation. … [W]itness disqualification rules, and their abolition, were important causal factors in the 
timing of tort law’s emergence as a discrete common law subject.”) (emphasis supplied).  
115 See infra notes 190–202, and accompanying text.  
116 See supra notes 52–53, and accompanying text. 
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states had eliminated this prohibition.117  Beginning in the Jacksonian era, courts and legislatures 
were less inclined to prohibit contingent fees as champterty and viewed them instead as a vehicle 
to help those of limited means sue to vindicate their rights.118 
The number of attorneys in New York City increased 49 percent during the single decade 
of the 1890s.119  Strikingly, the increase in attorneys who were the children of immigrants, whom 
Witt argues were more likely than other attorneys to specialize in representing personal injury 
victims, was 85 percent.120 The rate of increase in the number of plaintiffs’ attorneys was even 
dramatically greater in some other urban centers.121  These urban personal injury attorneys 
employed “runners” who sought to arrive at an accident scene as soon as possible in order to sign 
the injured victim to a contract with the runner’s employer,122 as  well as “ward healers, 
ambulance drivers, police, telephone operators, and hospital staff” who helped “identify and 
recruit accident victims.”123  Plaintiff’s personal injury attorneys, with their immigrant 
backgrounds and sometimes-questionable business practices, created controversy with leaders of 
the bar and more established attorneys, particularly those representing businesses and insurance 
companies.124  
The relationship between the development of liability insurance, the abolition of the 
witness disqualification rule, and the emergence of the specialized plaintiff’s injury bar, on one 
hand, and the increase in the frequency of personal injury claims and the liability exposure of 
large businesses, is a complicated one.   Both the development of liability insurance and the 
expansion of the personal injury bar no doubt contributed to the increase in the number of 
                                                          
117 See Kartsen, supra note 36, at 240–41. 
118 Id. 
119 See WITT, supra note 32, at 61.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. (giving the example of Buffalo where “the growth in the number of lawyers who were the white children of 
immigrants was an astounding 170 percent from 1890 to 1900”) 
122 Id. at 62.  
123 See Kartsen, supra note 52, at 257.  
124 Id. at 257–58.  
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claims, but these factors themselves resulted from the increase in the number of personal injuries 
that occurred.   
The cause-and-effect relationship between the abolition of the witness disqualification 
rule and the increase in the number of personal injury claims is similarly bidirectional.  The 
ability of the plaintiff and interested family members to testify regarding the causes of the 
accident certainly made it more likely that the injured victim would file suit.  At the same time, it 
seems likely that the prospect that victims would suffer increasingly severe (especially) and more 
frequent injuries at the hands of anonymous, faceless corporations during the mid-nineteenth 
century contributed to the demise of that rule.  None of these variables are truly independent; 
each is intertwined with others.  What is clear is that all these changes, in whatever sequence, 
took place on the heels of industrialization and the development of the vast railroad network.125  
 
C. The Development of the Classical Negligence Regime 
 
Legal scholars usually agree that the law governing personal injury claims changed from 
a strict liability standard in 1820 to a negligence regime by 1870.  With a fair number of 
exceptions, that negligence regime continues to provide the basic framework for personal injury 
law in the twenty-first century.  In this Part, I describe how the law had changed by the last 
decades of the nineteenth century.  I also evaluate the competing theories for why this change 
took place.  
1. The Law Governing Liability for Personal Injuries by the late-Nineteenth Century 
 
Most legal historians and tort scholars agree that by the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, the law governing accidents was dramatically different and less hospitable to personal 
                                                          
125 See generally Balkin, supra note 1, at 50 (“The problem of physical injury is not simply a feature of essential 
characteristics of a technology.  Rather, it arises from the way that a new technology interacts with a social and legal 
world already in place.”).  
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injury claims than it had been during the early decades of the century.126  Horwitz describes the 
change in the law during the fifty-year period in dramatic terms: “[T]he rise of the negligence 
principle in America overthrew basic eighteenth century private law categories and led to a 
radical transformation … in the theory of legal liability.”127 
The differences between the law governing liability for personal injuries in the early 
nineteenth century and the corresponding law in the 1870s constitute the most consequential 
changes in the history of American tort law.  First, the injured victim was now required to prove 
that the defendant acted negligently (with fault).128  Horwitz identifies three distinct phases in the 
emergence of the negligence standard.129  During the first phase, in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, courts began to view negligence as a matter of misfeasance instead of solely 
as a matter of nonfeasance, that is, the failure to fulfill a contractual or other autonomously 
ordained duty.  In the second phase, beginning in the 1820s, courts start to appreciate the 
distinction between “cause” and “fault.”  Even today, those not educated in the law often say that 
one driver in a car collision “caused” the accident, when what they mean is that the driver was 
the one at fault and not merely that her or his conduct was a necessary factual antecedent of the 
collision.  Finally, in the third phase of the development of negligence, according to Horwitz, 
“beginning around 1840, the negligence doctrine breaks out of its rigid confinement to highway 
and ship collision cases and begins directly to challenge the presumption of compensation for 
                                                          
126 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 84, at 211–24; FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 223–25; HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 85, 
95–101; WITT, supra note 32, at 43–48; Gregory, supra note 60, at 383–84.  
127 Horwitz, supra note 33, at 85.  At least one leading scholar strongly disagreed with Horwitz’s characterization of 
the change in the law as “a radical transformation,” as well as many other aspects of Horwitz’s thesis regarding the 
development of negligence.  See Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America, supra note 
32, at 1721 (arguing that “the nineteenth-century American negligence rule developed in a basically evolutionary 
way”); but cf., Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, supra note 63, at 678 (acknowledging, in a 
subsequent article, that “I am now inclined to avoid sweeping statements on the question of novelty versus 
evolution”).   
128 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292, 295–96 (1850) (holding that in a trespass action, the plaintiff could 
not recover without showing both that the defendant acted without due care and that the plaintiff acted with due 
care).  
129 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 94–95.  
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injury in [other] settled areas of the law.”130  By the late nineteenth century, the requirement that 
the plaintiff prove negligence became particularly onerous, because most courts, at least in cases 
involving claims brought by injured employees, found that if the defendant-employer’s conduct 
corresponded with the custom in its trade or business, this established that the defendant was not 
negligent as a matter of law.131 
By the late nineteenth century, the negligence regime also included a trinity of 
affirmative defenses—the fellow servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence—
that frequently prevented personal injury victims from recovering.132  During that era, the most 
important of these defenses was the fellow servant rule.133  In his infamous opinion in Farwell v. 
Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp.,134 Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court held that even though an employer was vicariously liable for the torts 
committed by his employees acting within the scope of employment in most instances, an injured 
employee could not recover from the employer for an injury caused by the tortious conduct of 
another employee.135  The proffered justification for the doctrine was that the injured employee 
was in a better position to be aware of the negligent conduct of his fellow employee than was the 
employer.136  While such a rule could arguably be justified “with a small preindustrial workshop 
in mind,” it “rested on unrealistic assumptions and was not suitable” when applied to “dangerous 
equipment and a complex and compartmentalized workforce”137  of railroads and other large 
                                                          
130 Id. at 95. 
131 E.g., Shadford v. Ann Arbor St. Ry., 69 N.W. 661, 663 (Mich. 1897) (finding no liability as a matter of law 
because the industrial tool “was one of a kind in general use throughout the country”); Allison Mfg. Co. v. 
McCormick, 12 A. 273, 275 (Pa. 1888) (“The general rule requires of the master that he provide materials and 
implements for the use of his servant such as are ordinarily used by persons in the same business, but he is not 
required to secure the best known materials”). 
132 See ELY, supra note 84, at 214–16, 221.  
133 See id. at 214–16; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 223–25.  
134 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). 
135 Id. at 57 (holding that an employee “takes upon himself … the perils arising from the carelessness and negligence 
of those who are in the same employment”).  
136 Id. (reasoning that “perils arising from the carelessness and negligence of those … in the same employment … 
are perils which the servant is as likely to know, and against which he can as effectually guard, as the master.”). 
137 ELY, supra note 84, at 215. 
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corporations in the late nineteenth century.  Within decades after the virtually universal adoption 
of the fellow-servant rule, some states repealed it by statute.138  Later, the Federal Employer’s 
Liability Act, covering railroad employees among others, and state workers’ compensation acts, 
abrogated the fellow-servant rule.139  
The second of the common law defenses to the negligence action was “assumption of 
risk,” which once again operated with particular harshness in cases brought by employees against 
their employers.140  The phrase itself denotes three separate ways that a defendant may negate the 
plaintiff’s recovery.141  Two of these ways, together categorized as “implied assumption of risk,” 
often served as important obstacles to recovery for personal injury victims, particularly workers, 
during the reign of classical negligence law.  They also were often muddled.142  In the first 
instance (which sometimes was called “primary implied” assumption of risk),143 the employer 
was not liable if its workplace, despite posing dangers to workers, complied with a reasonable 
standard of care, often construed to mean that it complied with the custom of other similar 
employers.144  In the second sense of the term “assumption of risk,” even if the employer were 
found to be negligent for subjecting the employee to unreasonable risks, it could still escape 
liability for its “negligence if the employee, by accepting or continuing in the employment with 
‘notice’ of such negligence, ‘assumed the risk.’”145 
                                                          
138 Id. at 215–16. 
139 Id. at 216.  
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141 The first, that a defendant may disclaim liability through a contractual provision, see, e.g., 4 FOWLER V. HARPER 
ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 21.6 (2007) (describing such contractual disclaimers and analyzing 
their validity), is not relevant here.  
142 See Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. 318 U.S. 54, 68 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (describing “[t]he phrase 
[as] an excellent illustration of the extent to which uncritical use of words bedevils the law.  A phrase begins life as a 
literary expression; its felicity leads to its lazy repetition; and repetition soon establishes it as a legal formula, 
undiscriminatingly used to express different and sometimes contradictory ideas.”).  
143 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 2 cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 2000). (describing the 
use of the label primary implied assumption of risk in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century). 
144 See also supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
145 Tiller, 318 U.S. at 68-69 ((Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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The third and final affirmative defense to negligence was contributory negligence.  
Today, in forty-six states, the victim’s own lack of reasonable care that contributed to her injury 
will in many instances only reduce the plaintiff’s recovery, but in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, the plaintiff’s contributory negligence served as a total bar to recovery.146  
Thus, the momentary mental lapse of the driver of a vehicle approaching a railroad crossing or a 
worker waiting for a train to pass precluded recovery regardless of the level of egregiousness of 
the defendant’s fault.147 
In short, by the waning decades of the nineteenth century, there were far more barriers to 
the recovery by personal injury victims than had been present during the first decades of the 
century.  The plaintiff now was required to prove fault.  Even if it could be shown that the 
defendant, usually a railroad, an employer, or another business, was negligent, recovery was 
often prevented by one of the trinity of common law defenses, including the fellow-servant rule, 
assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.   
2. The Economic Explanation for the “Radical Transformation” of Nineteenth Century 
Tort Law 
 
The decidedly pro-defendant, substantial changes in the law governing liability for 
personal injuries during the nineteenth century are temporally correlated with the Industrial 
Revolution, especially the development of a vast railway network, and with the onslaught of 
injuries these new enterprises caused.  The question remains whether this technological 
transformation of the economy in any way caused the equally dramatic changes in tort law.  The 
                                                          
146 See Donald G. Gifford & Christopher J. Robinette, Apportioning Liability in Maryland Tort Cases: Time to End 
Contributory Negligence and Joint and Several Liability, 73 MD. L. REV. 701, 723 (2014) (noting that all American 
jurisdictions treated contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery).  
147 See Bazzell v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 300 P. 1108 (Kan. 1931) (barring recovery for death of automobile 
driver struck by train that failed to sound bell and was obstructed by overgrown vegetation); Farmer v. Michigan 
Cent. Ry. Co. 58 N.W. 45 (Mich. 1894) (barring recovery for the death of a railroad worker struck by a boxcar while 
waiting to board his train); Summers v. Burdick, 13 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Ct. App. 1961) (refusing to hold automobile 
driver liable for striking visually impaired plaintiff).  
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prevailing view among legal historians, notably Horwitz and Friedman, is that it did.148  
Friedman attributes the cause of what he describes as the “explosion of tort law” that 
characterized the era to “the Industrial Revolution—the age of engines and machines.”149  
However, Schwartz explicitly disagrees with the “Horwitz thesis.”150   Moreover, a competing 
explanation for the emergence of the negligence regime contends that the new fault-based system 
emerged as a consequence of mid-nineteenth century political liberal thought.151  It is unclear, 
however, that these changes in liberal thought were truly independent of the Industrial 
Revolution and the resulting technological transformation of the economy.152   
Probably the leading explanation for the dramatic changes in tort law during the mid-
nineteenth century is that these changes facilitated industrial and railroad expansion.153  If the 
enterprises that emerged during the mid-nineteenth centuries had been held liable for the 
majority of the injuries and damages they caused, as they would have been under the strict 
liability principles that prevailed at the beginning of the century, so the theory goes, their 
businesses would have been less profitable and would not have been able to attract new capital.  
With the change to a system holding tortfeasors liable only for harms caused by their negligence, 
often interpreted to mean “non-customary” conduct,154 the liability exposure of businesses 
heavily invested in new technologies was almost assuredly substantially reduced.  As a result, 
railroads, mines, and factories flourished.  In effect, the change from a strict liability to a 
                                                          
148 See infra notes 153–159, and accompanying text.  
149 FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 223.  
150 See infra notes 160–165, and accompanying text. 
151 See infra notes 173–185, and accompanying text. 
152 See infra notes 187–190, and accompanying text. 
153 See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29 (1972) (describing this as the “orthodox 
view”); Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy, supra note 32, at 1717 (describing this as the “prevailing view”); 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 223–24; HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 99–100; Gregory, supra note 60, at 365 (stating 
that “many of our judges believed that the development of this young country under a system of private enterprise 
would be hindered and delayed as long as the element of chance exposed enterprisers to liability for the 
consequences of pure accident, without fault of some sort.”).  
154 See supra note 131, and accompanying text. 
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negligence-based regime created a “subsidy” for railroads and other newly emerging 
industries.155   
The follow-up question is whether common law judges, including Chief Justice Lemuel 
Shaw who decided both Brown v. Kendell and Farewell v. Boston & Worcester Railroad Corp., 
knowingly and/or intentionally subsidized railroads and other businesses.  Friedman answers the 
question this way:  
But was Shaw also trying to subsidize the railroads? Perhaps not consciously.  But 
he must have been aware how popular it was to encourage the development of 
railroads.  Railroad building was popular, not only for people involved in what we 
would now call big business, but for the ordinary farmer or merchant, eager to get 
his goods to the market.  It can hardly be a coincidence that so many emerging 
doctrines of tort law tilted toward railroads and other enterprises.  There was no 
conspiracy.  But there was, no doubt, a widespread consensus.156 
 
Horwitz is much more explicit in calling the change in liability standards a “subsidy” for 
railroads and other emerging businesses and in attributing distributional motives to the judges 
responsible for these changes.  He notes that state legislatures repeatedly had subsidized the 
development of canals during the 1820s and 1830s by granting monopolies or franchises and 
incurring debt, but without raising taxes.157  Substantial cash outlays to railroad corporations 
would have required increases in taxes.  One might conjecture that by the 1830s, entrepreneurs 
who stood to profit from the development of railroads and other industrial enterprises had begun 
to realize that increasing taxes to subsidize their projects was a two-edged sword.  They may 
have feared that such a practice would lead at least some Jacksonian state legislatures to 
recognize the possibility of increasing taxes on the wealthy to benefit the less affluent.158  As 
                                                          
155 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 99–100 (“One of the most striking aspects of legal change during the antebellum 
period is the extent to which common law doctrines were transformed to create immunities from legal liability and 
thereby to provide substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development.”); but see 
Posner supra note 153, at 73 (stating that “I discern no systematic bias in the law of negligence as it was applied 
between 1875 and 1905 in favor of industrial growth and expansion, except insofar as the efficient use of resources 
may be thought to foster … economic development. … The rules of liability seem to have been broadly designed to 
bring about the efficient (cost-justified) level of accidents and safety.”).  
156 FRIEDMAN, supra note 38, at 224–25. 
157 See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 100.  
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Horwitz notes, “Change brought about through technical legal doctrine can more easily disguise 
underlying political choices.  Subsidy through the tax system, by contrast, inevitably involves 
greater dangers of explicitly political conflict.”159   
Schwartz takes strong exception to the subsidy thesis and Horwitz’s characterization of 
the changes in nineteenth century tort law as a “radical transformation.” There are several 
significant threads to his critique.  First, as previously described, Schwartz contends that, at least 
in the handful of states that he studied, elements of negligence law had emerged prior to 1830.160  
However, his analysis did not include the dominant economic and legal hotspots of mid-
nineteenth century America, such as New York, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania.  Further, 
Schwartz did not and could not convincingly argue that the predominant standard for liability 
during the later decades of the nineteenth century was anything other than a negligence standard 
accompanied by the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the 
fellow servant rule.  Instead, he finds, more subtly, that although “[n]ineteenth-century tort law 
in New Hampshire and California emphasized negligence as the standard of liability … , [c]ourts 
were reluctant to find that economic factors justified a defendant’s risk-taking.”161  Similarly, he 
argues that the cases surveyed sometimes displayed a “negligence standard with a highly 
expansive quality”162 and although the New Hampshire and California supreme courts “from an 
early date accepted the traditional rule of contributory negligence as a complete defense[,] … 
[they] were openly ambivalent about the rule.”163  From these observations, he concludes that 
“the nineteenth-century American negligence rule developed in a basically evolutionary way.”164   
                                                          
159 Id. at 100–101.  
160 See supra note 127.  
161 Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy, supra note 32, at 1757. 
162 Id. at 1759.  See also Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, supra note 63, at 679 (“Negligence 
can fairly be called the primary liability idea in nineteenth-century tort law, but it was by no means the exclusive 
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Schwartz also directly rejects the thesis of Horwitz and Friedman that what drove the 
change to the negligence regime was a desire to subsidize railroads and other emerging 
industries.  He chronicles several cases from California and New Hampshire in which the courts 
generously applied the doctrines of the negligence regime and enabled plaintiffs to recover 
against exactly these types of defendants.165   
Assessing the debate between Horwitz and Friedman, on one hand, and Schwartz on the 
other hand, Ely concludes “that the knotty history of railroad tort liability does not fully support 
any unifying theory.”166  He explicitly notes the 1853 Tennessee Supreme Court decision in 
Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Company v. Messino,167 in which the court indicates that its 
goals simultaneously included that “the most perfect safety should be secured” at the same time 
that “the rules of accountability should be reasonable, that men may not be deterred from 
devoting their time, capital, or energies to these very useful, and now almost indispensable 
enterprises.”168  Similarly, after Professor (now Judge) Richard Posner surveyed tort opinions 
issued between 1875 and 1905, he concluded that “the rules of liability seem to have been 
broadly designed to bring about the efficient (cost-justified) level of accidents and safety… .”169  
Of course, if the continued application of pre-1830s strict liability principles to newly emerging 
industries and railroads would have deterred industrial and railroad expansion at a level that was 
more than cost-justified, there is nothing in Posner’s finding that is inconsistent with the 
Horwitz/Friedman thesis that the change in the law to the newly unfolding negligence regime 
was consciously designed to facilitate industrial expansion.   
                                                          
165 Id. at 1742–49 (reporting the ways in which courts sometimes generously applied the doctrines of the negligence 
regime and enabled plaintiffs to recover). 
166 ELY, supra note 84, at 212.  
167 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 220, 227 (1853) (affirming judgment for passenger negligently thrown from train).  
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In tone, at least, Horwitz and, to a lesser extent, Friedman, may be overstating the 
revolutionary quality of the change in nineteenth century tort law.170  Yet the American law 
governing personal injury did change rather dramatically from a set of under-developed doctrines 
based on an English writ system that had changed only slightly over the course of several 
centuries, a body of law that had evolved to address entirely different harms.  By the end of the 
nineteenth-century, many accident victims whose injuries were inflicted by the fruits of 
technological change were denied compensation on the grounds of tort doctrines that did not 
exist a half-century earlier.  The law governing liability for personal injury accidents changed 
dramatically in the nineteenth century, and the pace of the change was radical compared to the 
grudging pace of change that characterized the previous centuries of English and American 
common law,171 a system where courts were presumed to follow precedents.172    
3. Alternative Explanations for Changes in Nineteenth-Century Tort Law  
 
G. Edward White173 and John Fabian Witt have both proffered alternative explanations to 
what Witt refers to as the Horwtiz/Friedman “materialist”174 account of the rise of the negligence 
regime. 
White’s explanation focuses on “changes in intellectual thought” during the mid-
nineteenth century and rejects the “subsidy thesis”, but he nevertheless acknowledges the primary 
role of technological change as an instigator of the development of the negligence regime.  He 
begins by arguing that “[i]t is misleading … to speak of separate “tort” actions let alone standards 
                                                          
170 In the first edition of A History of American Law, Friedman referred to the nineteenth-century negligence regime 
as “cruel” and as a “beast.”  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 426–27 (1st ed. 1973).  
Similarly, Gregory described the “ruthless” nature of the same body of law.  Gregory, supra note 60, at 368.   
171 See John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law of Accidents, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 22 
(2007).  
172 See, e.g., United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 1965) (“The genius of the common law lies in 
the process of reasoned elaboration from past precedent”); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An 
Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1107 (1997) (explaining that the requirement that common law 
courts’ decisions be tied to precedents or “explicit text . . . provides legitimacy to judge-made rules”). 
173 G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 3–19 (2003).  
174 WITT, supra note 32, at 8.  
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of tort liability, before the nineteenth century.”175  Like Horwitz, he views the “growth of 
negligence from the omission of a preexisting, specific duty owed to a limited class of persons to 
the violation of a generalized standard of care owed to all.”176  The negligence regime, in his 
mind, “seems to have been an intellectual response to the increased numbers of accidents 
involving persons who had no preexisting relationship with one another—“stranger cases.”177  
These accidents involving the interaction of strangers occurred far more frequently because of 
new technologies, particularly railroads.  According to White, changes in intellectual thought 
combined with the carnage accidentally inflicted by new technologies to produce the negligence 
regime.   White writes that “Americans became more focused on individual freedom … and 
occupational mobility.”178  As a result, “a new dynamic atomistic vision, which emphasized 
man’s potential to alter the conditions under which he might exercise his capacity for 
achievement,” emerged.179   
Witt argues that the emergence of the negligence standard resulted from the influence of 
the contemporaneous prevalence of what is often referred to as “nineteenth-century political 
liberalism.”180  John Stuart Mill articulated a basic premise of this philosophy when he wrote that 
“the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over” another “is to prevent harm 
to others.”181  As Witt notes, a judicial decision imposing liability was seen by courts and legal 
scholars of the time as an imposition on a defendant’s liberty.182  These lawmakers, influenced by 
political liberalism, had no difficulty in holding a tortfeasor liable when it had been negligent and 
the plaintiff was free of fault because in that instance, the court’s power was exercised “to prevent 
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178 Id. at 4.  
179 Id. 
180 See WITT, supra note 32, at 45–49. 
181 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1859). 
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harm to others.”183  However, the situation in which a defendant had caused harm to a victim 
without any fault on the defendant’s part posed a dilemma:  how could they justify limiting the 
defendant’s freedom when the defendant could not reasonably have avoided the harm?184  As 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote in 1881, “[T]he prevailing view is that the state’s “cumbrous 
and expensive machinery ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived 
from disturbing the status quo.”185  The wave of political liberalism led to an increased focused on 
fault and moral wrongdoing in the law, as well as in other aspects of American society.186  
Political liberalism, however, is not an alternative, independent explanation for the rise of 
the negligence regime, but instead is itself, in least in part, a consequence of the Industrial 
Revolution.187  The Industrial Revolution nurtured the development of the class of entrepreneurs 
and managers who became the advocates for liberal political reform in the nineteenth century.188  
Echoing the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, mid-nineteenth century political liberalism saw 
infringements on the free market, whether through legislation or excessive liabilities imposed by 
common law courts, as threatening the security of property, social utility, and progress.189  
Attributing the rise of negligence to political liberalism adds an intermediate step in the causal 
chain between technological advances and the dramatic changes in nineteenth-century tort law, 
but it does not eliminate the relationship.  
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184 Id. at 47 (explaining that “[a] negligence standard that held individuals liable for damages only when they failed 
to exercise reasonable care would allow individuals to act feely within their rights, without compromising those 
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D. Technology as the Cause of the Classical Negligence Regime  
 
By the 1870s, as Witt describes it, the United States was experiencing an unprecedented 
accidental injury crisis190  that led to the first major transformation of American tort law.  This 
dramatic change, from a strict liability standard to the negligence regime, resulted from a judicial 
weighing of the aggregate liability facing railroads and other industrial defendants against the 
social utility of such industries.  The increase in aggregate liability was a product of the 
increased severity of personal injury accidents during the industrial era,191 a possible increase in 
the frequency of such accidents,192 and several factors making it easier for plaintiffs to prove 
their claims, each of which was itself a consequence of new technologies.  The witness 
disqualification rule was abrogated193 and a professional plaintiff’s personal injury bar emerged 
for the first time.194  Further, the development of large-scale corporations and liability 
insurance195 afforded victims a source of meaningful compensation, as well as an incentive for 
attorneys retained on a contingent-fee basis to pursue their claims.  Each of these developments, 
however, themselves resulted from the increase in the liability exposure of railroads and other 
industrial defendants.196  
In addition, to the threatened increase in aggregate liability, the decisive variable 
responsible for the transformation from the pre-industrial strict liability rules to the negligence 
regime that emerged during the mid-nineteenth century was the perceived (and genuine) social 
utility of railroads and other industrial enterprises.197 At a time when Americans were 
enthusiastically supportive of railroads and other new technologies, the application of tort law 
                                                          
190 See Witt, supra note 42, at 694. 
191 See supra notes 82–87, 91–92, and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 82–92, and accompanying text. 
193 See supra notes 110–115 and accompanying text. 
194 See supra notes 116–124 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra notes 95–109 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
197 See supra notes 70–73, and accompanying text. 
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that existed at the turn of the nineteenth century likely would have discouraged the capital 
contributions necessary to expand these new technologies.  
Compelling evidence indicates that by late-nineteenth century, the substantive law 
governing claims for personal injuries was more daunting to the personal injury victim that it had 
been a half-century earlier.  Plaintiffs were required to prove negligence.198  Correspondence 
with custom by defendants either established compliance with due care as a matter of law or at 
least was strong evidence of a lack of negligence.199  Perhaps most importantly, many victims, 
particularly employees of railroads and other industrial enterprises, were barred from recovery 
by the fellow-servant rule,200 assumption of risk,201 and contributory negligence.202  These 
changes in substantive law, the most important changes in the law governing liability for 
personal injuries in at least five hundred years, occurred during the same half-century as did the 
most important changes in how technology affected ordinary human life that had occurred at any 
point in human history to that time.  
 
III.  The Legal Aftershocks of the Industrial Revolution 
 
The most significant transformation of American tort law was the victory of the 
negligence regime during the mid-nineteenth century.  In the early twenty-first century, 
American society faces the prospect of the second American tort revolution: the substantive 
law’s response to autonomous vehicles, robotics, and artificial intelligence.203  During the 
intervening period of more than a century, American accident compensation law also witnessed 
additional significant changes: notably, the enactment of the workers’ compensation system,204 
the routinized processing of claims arising from automobile accidents applying informal rules 
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that often conflicted with the formal law,205 and the rise (and fall) of strict products liability, each 
of which can be traced to changes in the economic structure resulting from technological 
development.206  In this Part, I trace the origins of these legal developments to aftershocks of the 
Industrial Revolution.    
 
A. The Factory System and the Enactment of Workers’ Compensation 
 
The economic changes resulting from the “second Industrial Revolution”207 were far 
from completed by the end of the nineteenth century.  Even as late as the 1870s, most American 
families remained largely unaffected by the technological changes of the nineteenth century.  
Most Americans continued to wear clothing handcrafted at home and eat food that they had 
raised.208  Horses, not machines, provided most transportation.209  Appliances such as 
refrigerators and gas or electric powered stoves were still far in the future.  
As previously noted,210 however, the propagation of railroads and other technological 
developments, paved the way for the development of factories.211  Railroads shipped raw 
materials to factories and in turn, and more importantly, distributed their products to a 
widespread national market.  Without railroads or a similar transportation system, mass 
production of consumer goods on the assembly line would have been impossible.  
                                                          
205 See infra notes 231–278, and accompanying text. 
206 See infra notes 279–341, and accompanying text. 
207 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH: THE U.S. STANDARD OF LIVING SINCE THE 
CIVIL WAR 31 (2016) (labelling the technological changes beginning in 1870 and continuing into the early decades 
of the twentieth century as the “Second Industrial Revolution”).  
208 Id. at 39–43 (describing prevalence of home production of clothing and food in 1870).  
209 Id. at 48. 
210 See supra notes 88-89, and accompanying text. 
211 See Jeremy Atack et al., Railroads and the Rise of the Factory: Evidence for the United States, 1850-70, at 6, 
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14410) (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14410.pdf. (reporting empirical findings that “the coming of the railroad was a causal 
factor in the rise of factories.”).   
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Simultaneously with the proliferation of factories, railroad networks continued to expand212 and 
machinery became a ubiquitous feature of American life, particularly in workplaces.213 
 As described in Part II, the negligence regime, particularly the application of its fellow-
servant rule, made it exceptionally difficult for workers to recover for injuries sustained during 
their employment.  By the turn of the twentieth century, this situation was intolerable to workers, 
their unions, and social reformers.214  At the same time, corporate employers feared that the 
onerous consequences of the fellow-servant rule doomed it and that its abrogation within the 
common-law system would result in greatly expanded aggregate corporate liability.215 American 
corporations increasingly feared massive common-law liability exposure as liability insurance 
and accumulated profits made them attractive targets216 from the new professionalized plaintiff’s 
bar.217  
The result, in the second decade of the twentieth century, was the widespread enactment 
of workers’ compensation statutes.218  Under workers’ compensation, workers injured in the 
course of employment recovered benefits without proving fault on the employer’s part.219  
Further, and more importantly, the statutes eliminated the affirmative defenses of the fellow-
servant rule, assumption of risk, and contributory negligence.220  However, workers’ 
                                                          
212 See PURSELL, supra note 28, at 175 (stating that “[i]n the years after the Civil War, it was the railroad that 
colonized the West”).  
213 See PORTER, supra note 96, at 44–45 (noting the importance of “the appearance of an array of technological 
advances in manufacturing technology” as a cause of “the coming of big business”).  
214 See PRICE V. FISHBACK & SHAWN EVERETT KANTOR, A PRELUDE TO THE WELFARE STATE: THE ORIGINS OF 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION (2000) (describing the dissatisfaction of social reformers like Crystal Eastman and the 
American Association of Labor Legislation with the negligence liability system); WITT, supra note 32, at 130–32 
(describing impact of Eastman’s work).  
215 See WITT, supra note 32, at 67 (describing statutory and judicial abrogation of fellow-servant doctrine in period 
preceding adoption of workers’ compensation statutes).  
216 See supra notes 95–99, and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 116–124, and accompanying text. 
218 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 214, at 54 (stating that “[b]etween 1911 and 1921, forty-three states adopted 
workers’ compensation laws at the behest of political coalitions combining workers, employers, and insurers”).   
219 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §11.2 (describing workers’ compensation); Richard A. Epstein, The 
Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers’ Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 797–800 (1982) 
(describing abolition of both fault as a requirement of liability and fault-based affirmative defenses).   
220 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §11.2; Epstein, supra note 219, at 798.  Similarly, the Federal Employers’ 
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012), enacted in 1908, governed injuries sustained by railroad workers.  
An injured railroad worker must prove negligence on the part of the employer to recover, but the act eliminated the 
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compensation acts eliminated the right of injured workers to have a jury adjudicate their claims, 
and compensation under the acts was severely limited.221  Claimants received no compensation 
for noneconomic injuries (“pain and suffering”), recovery for loss of income was significantly 
limited,222 and future medical expenses were paid as they were incurred.  It was also believed 
that workers’ compensation would substantially reduce the transaction costs involved in 
adjudicating claims.223  Administrative hearings replaced jury trials,224 and attorney fees for 
claimants’ attorneys were strictly limited.225 
The enactment of workers’ compensation statutes and the Federal Employers Liability 
Act are most accurately interpreted as necessary counter moves to the development of the 
classical negligence regime that was not fully satisfactory to either employers or to their workers.  
The critical variable for injured workers and their union representatives was the increased 
difficulty of proving the employer’s negligence in an industrialized workplace dominated by 
machine technology.226  Businesses, however, feared that any return to a strict-liability common 
law system in an attempt to ease proof of liability would increase their aggregate liability 
                                                          
fellow-servant rule and replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence.  The defense of assumption 
of risk was later eliminated in actions under FELA.    
221 See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §11.2. 
222 Id.  
223 See FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 214, at 11–12 (before the implementation of the workers’ compensation 
system, “Attorney’s fees, court costs, and the administrative costs of insurance left a 40 to 60 percent gap between 
what employers paid out for postaccident compensation and what workers ultimately received;” arguing, however, 
that because “most cases under negligence liability were settled outside the courts, it is very difficult to determine 
even whether administrative costs per injury … declined”).   
224 See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §11.2; Epstein, supra note 219, at 801.   
225 FISHBACK & KANTOR, supra note 214, at 228 (reporting that “[a]t most, 5 percent of the total amount that 
workers received went to lawyers under workers’ compensation”). 
226 See WITT, supra note 32, at 128 (noting that early explanations of the origins of workers’ compensation saw it as 
“an unambiguous advance from a stingy nineteenth-century law of employers’ liability to a regime organized around 
serving the needs of injury workers.”).  In his comprehensive and insightful consideration of the origins of workers’ 
compensation, Witt emphasizes the contributions of lawyer-journalist Crystal Eastman and how she shifted the focus 
on the effects of workplace injuries from the direct victims themselves to those suffered by the members of the 
workers’ families.  Id. at 129–32.  Witt also notes that “national labor leaders … generally supported workmen’s 
compensation legislation, but often in ways that hinted at a deep ambivalence.”  Id. at 147.  Social reformers saw the 
enactment of workers’ compensation as the beginning of a movement toward more widespread social reform 
legislation, such as social security, unemployment insurance, and national health insurance. Id. at 149–50; see also 
Jeremiah Smith, Sequel to Workmen’s Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 344, 363–65 (1914) (suggesting that in 
the wake of the adoption of workers’ compensation, broader social legislation might be enacted).  
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exposure.  These concerns likely would cause them to cut-back or slowdown their business 
activities that continued to be perceived as offering great social utility.227   
The solution, workers’ compensation, dramatically reduced the difficulty of proving the 
prerequisites of liability by abrogating the need to prove fault and in the process reduced 
transaction costs by replacing common-law juries with professional administrative agencies.228  
At the same time, the workers’ compensation system moderated the feared increase in the 
liability exposure facing employers and made it more predictable. The severity of paid claims 
was reduced by disallowing recovery for noneconomic damages, capping recovery for economic 
losses, and placing responsibility for assessing the amount of damages to be paid with 
administrative agencies instead of common law juries.  
Following the adoption of workers’ compensation, the frequency of claims for personal 
injuries resulting from employment greatly increased.229  The increase in claims was so dramatic 
that employers’ aggregate liability exposure increased, even though the average amount of paid 
claims was reduced because of capped benefits and the lack of compensation for noneconomic 
damages.  With that increase, however, employers received assurance that they would not be 
slammed with a huge verdict in any single case and that future changes in the common law, such 
as the abolition of the fellow-servant rule, would not greatly increase their liability exposure for 
workplace accidents.230    
                                                          
227 See WITT, supra note 32, at 128 (noting that [b]y the late 1960s, [h]istorians in the then-ascendant corporate-
liberal school explained the enactment of compensation statutes as a novel gambit by employers to reduce and 
standardize the mounting costs of jury awards under the common law of employers’ liability”).  Witt observes that 
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43 
 
B. The “Evil Deity’s”231 Gift of the Automobile 
 
The widespread ownership and use of automobiles dramatically increased the scope of 
the accidental-injury problem in the United States.  Jonathan Simon writes that “[i]n 1919 the 
automobile was still largely seen as a luxury item,” but “[b]y 1929, … it was visibly 
transforming American life.232  More than 3,735,000 new automobiles were sold in 1925, and by 
the end of the decade, one-half of American households owned an automobile.233  The social 
utility of the widespread use of the automobile was obvious.  As Nora Engstrom observes, 
“automobiles are central to the American way of life, ‘permitting an impatient people to conquer 
space and time.’ ”234 
With the advent of the automobile, the number of machines capable of inflicting serious 
personal injuries dramatically increased, and these machines and their “attendant carnage” were 
“broadly distributed across the social landscape.”235  Writing in the Columbia Law Review in 
1925, Robert Marx observed: 
Formerly, when horse drawn vehicles, slow in movement and few in number, 
were the principal means of transportation, there was comparatively little danger 
in the use of the streets.  But the increasing use and speed of automobiles have 
made our streets more dangerous than our factories and are causing a greater loss 
of life and a greater number of casualties or losses than in the World War.236  
 
The automobile fatality rate increased five-hundred percent between 1913 and 1931.237  
Thirty-three thousand people died in automobile accidents in 1930,238 a number only slightly less 
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than the thirty-five thousand that died in 2010, despite the dramatic increase during that period of 
time in both the number of automobiles and the number of miles driven.239  In 1929, automobile 
accidents accounted for twenty-nine percent of all accidental deaths, as compared with seven 
percent caused by railroad accidents.240  The distribution of the severity of these claims included 
many serious injuries.241  Even today, a majority of all torts claims arise from automobile 
accidents, as does three-quarters of the aggregate compensatory payments for tort claims.242 
Just as is the case today, in the 1930s, few owners and operators of automobile possess 
the financial resources to enable them to personally compensate those seriously injured in traffic 
accidents.243  Unlike in the nineteenth century when large industrial and transportation 
enterprises were liable for the torts committed by their employees,244 the more limited resources 
of most automobile owners posed the threat that there would be no source of funds to 
compensate victims of automobile accidents.  In the automobile context, the primary objective of 
liability insurance became to provide a source of compensation for the injured victim rather than 
to protect the assets of the tortfeasor.245 Unfortunately, only twenty-seven percent of all 
automobiles registered in 1929 had liability insurance coverage.246  At the same time, however, 
states were beginning to adopt “financial responsibility laws” that required automobile owners to 
either purchase insurance or to provide proof that they had sufficient financial resources to pay 
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claims.247  By 1935 a majority of states had enacted such statutes.248  Today forty-nine states 
mandate that automobile owners carry liability insurance, and the remaining state has a financial 
responsibility law.249 
Following closely on the heels of the adoption of workers’ compensation systems, the 
automobile-accident problem suggested the adoption of a no-fault compensation system.  In 
addition to the reality that insurance usually provided the only source of funds for compensation, 
“[o]btaining agreement on what constituted careless behavior [and] proving what had happened” 
posed challenges to the traditional tort system.250  Simon observes that “[t]he power and speed of 
motorized machinery … simply outstripped the capacity of even careful persons to guard against 
mishap, and magnified the consequences of lapses of care beyond moral recognition.”251  
Additionally, the limits of the owner’s insurance policy functionally capped recovery.  Most but 
not all injuries were relatively minor.  The limited size of many claims suggested finding a less 
costly and time-consuming resolution of claims.   
As early as 1932, a distinguished group of judges, lawyers, and law professors, assisted 
by two professional sociologists, proposed a no-fault compensation plan that generally is referred 
to as the “the Columbia Plan,”252 which echoed the structure of workers’ compensation—a no-
fault process providing limited benefits through an administrative compensation system.  
However, it was not until Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O’Connell proposed a no-fault system that 
retained elements of traditional tort law in 1965253 that states began to adopt automobile no fault.  
The basic plan, known as Personal Injury Protection (PIP), mandated that each auto owner 
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purchase first-party coverage that would cover the economic expenses, including medical 
expenses and lost wages, suffered by drivers and passengers in an automobile involved in a 
collision, as well as those of any injured pedestrians.254  These economic losses were capped at 
relatively modest amounts, and there was no recovery for noneconomic losses.  However, 
seriously injured victims of accidents, whose injuries either fell within articulated categories of 
more severe injuries or whose medical expenses exceeded statutorily-defined monetary 
thresholds, were able to sue in tort to recover noneconomic damages.255  A few states merely 
enacted “add-on” no-fault programs that provided victims with an alternative for seeking 
compensation for defined economic losses without restricting access to the court system.256 
By 1976, more than two-dozen states had enacted some form of no-fault compensation 
systems.257  However, no state has followed suit since 1976, and a number of states have 
repealed their mandatory no-fault plans.258  Proponents of no-fault legislation promised that no-
fault insurance would be less expensive than that in the negligence-based system,259 but that 
predication failed to materialize.260  A recent, comprehensive RAND analysis concludes that the 
primary cause of higher than anticipated no-fault premium rates is that reimbursed medical costs 
in no-fault states are higher than in traditional tort states.261  Further, insurers in no-fault states 
now are paying the same portion of victims’ noneconomic losses as those in fault-based states,262 
presumably because victims in no-fault states are able to file common-law actions for 
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noneconomic damages if their medical bills exceed a designated dollar threshold or fall within 
certain prescribed categories of injuries.  Finally, the higher costs of no-fault insurance in part 
reflects its comparative advantages over traditional liability insurance:  compensation of a larger 
proportion of those injured in automobile accidents,263 faster claims reimbursement, and greater 
consumer satisfaction.264  
Despite the prevailing trend away from formal automobile no-fault compensation 
systems, even in jurisdictions that nominally retain the traditional negligence-liability insurance 
system, the reality is that auto-claims processing functions much like a no-fault system.265  The 
routinization of auto claims results from the combination that the only funds available to pay a 
judgment in most cases is the automobile insurance policy, usually with fairly modest limits, and 
that such claims are handled by “repeat players” on both sides, insurance claims adjusters and 
plaintiffs’ attorneys who specialize in such claims.266  Often, such claims are simply settled at the 
amount of the liability policy.267 
Far more importantly for our purposes, fault plays a far less dominant role in the 
settlement process than would be expected if these negotiators were truly “bargaining in the 
shadow of the law”268 of the negligence regime.  In his comprehensive study of the claims 
settlement process published in 1970,269 H. Laurence Ross found that the negligence regime’s 
                                                          
263 See U.S. Department of Transportation, Compensating Auto Accident Victims: A Follow-Up Report on No-Fault 
Auto Insurance Experiences 3 (1985) (concluding that “[m]ore victims receive compensation under no-fault than 
under fault systems.”).  
264 See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 242, at 131.  
265 See Issacharoff & Witt, supra note 15, at 1615 (observing that “[t]he striking feature is the similarity of the 
mature tort injury system in auto claims to the administrative system of workmen’s compensation”).  See also 
generally Robinette, supra note 241, at 550–62 (describing the routinization of the auto claims process).    
266 See Robinette, supra note 241, at 559 (noting that “[m]any … automobile accidents now had repeat players on 
both sides”).  
267 See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 395–96 
(2010). 
268 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 
YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (introducing this fundamental concept providing that the legal rights of each party help 
determine settlement outcomes).  




requirement that there be fault for liability was frequently not observed.270  In order to settle 
cases quickly and expeditiously, the negotiating partners’ determination of liability focused 
largely on whether one or both parties violated traffic laws.271  However, Ross observed that in 
the “large majority of cases, … a claimant who has provable economic losses will recover 
something.”272  In virtually all cases, according to Ross, the claimant recovers at least her or his 
medical expenses.273  The determination of damages is also routinized, usually as some multiple 
of “medical expenses,” often “three-times medicals.”274 
 In recent years, the routinization of automobile claims has resulted in “settlement mills,” 
plaintiffs’ firms that specialize in automobile claims and often dominate the local market for 
such services.275  Such firms market aggressively, do little or no vetting of claims when they 
accept their clients, and handle extremely high caseloads.276  Settlement mills often engage in 
mass settlements, packaging claims that are weaker on the merits with those that are stronger.277 
As Engstrom reports, “even cases with serious liability issues are often amicably resolved.  
Insurers will offer something … for nearly every claim.”278 
In short, in practice the processing of routine automobile claims more closely resembles 
the workers’ compensation system than it does the traditional negligence model.  Claimants who 
can prove medical expenses recover compensation, even if the case for liability is weak or 
nonexistent.  Like workers’ compensation, the amount of the settlement is often formulaic.  
Claims processing is swift, and what would happen at trial is of minor interest at best. 
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Settlements are capped either by a formula such as “three times specials” or by the limits of the 
defendants’ insurance policies.  
C. The Rise and Fall of Strict Products Liability 
 
The mass production of automobiles and other consumer products also led to changes in 
the law governing what injured consumers or users of products needed to prove to recover 
damages from product manufacturers for personal injuries.   
1. The End of the Privity Requirement 
 
At the turn of the twentieth-century, it was generally impossible for victims to 
successfully sue the distant manufacturers whom had replaced local craftsman as the producers 
of household items.279  Before the Industrial Revolution, Americans generally relied upon 
themselves, family members, and local craft and trade individuals to supply the goods that they 
used in daily life.280  That all changed in the early twentieth century with the development of 
mass production factories and extensive railroad networks.281  The manufacturer and the product 
consumer now rarely met one another.  Instead, the manufacturer sold its finished products to a 
chain of one or more distributors who then sold their products to retailers who finally sold their 
products to consumers.  Ultimately, the finished product played a role in injuring the consumer, 
another user of the product, or even a bystander.282  
In the nineteenth century, the law had not caught up with these changes in the economy 
that resulted from technological change.  Those injured by defective products were precluded 
from recovering from manufacturers because English and American courts had consistently held 
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that the supplier of a product owed a duty of care only to those in “privity,” that is, linked by a 
direct contractual relationship, with the manufacturer.283  In the seminal decision in MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co.,284 Judge Cardozo held that an automobile manufacturer owed a duty of care 
to a user of a product “to make it carefully” whenever “it  is reasonably certain to place life and 
limb in peril when negligently made.”285   In doing so, Cardozo explicitly acknowledged the 
technological impetus for this important change in the law: “Precedents drawn from the days of 
travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today.”286  He went on to stress the 
appropriateness of changing the law to “the needs of life in a developing civilization.”287   
2. The Emergence of “Strict” Products Liability 
 
A few decades later, between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s, the mass production, 
consumer society prompted the development of “strict products liability,” which at the time 
appeared to be “the most radical and spectacular” change in American tort law during the 
twentieth century.288  At least facially at the time of its emergence, this new regime governing 
the liability of product manufacturers and other product sellers to the purchasers and users of 
their products, as well as bystanders injured by the products, did not require the plaintiff to prove 
fault or negligence.289  As such, strict products liability appeared to create an important common-
law exception to the general requirement that the personal injury claimant prove that the 
defendant acted with fault.290   
                                                          
283 See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) (denying recovery to the 
driver of a stagecoach against a contractor who had supplied the vehicle to the postmaster because there was no 
privity of contract between the parties).   
284 111 N.E. 1050, (N.Y. 1916).  
285 Id. at 1053. 
286 Id.   
287 Id.  In the decades that followed, other states fell in line behind the MacPherson decision, making it one of the 
most important American tort opinions of all time.  See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel 
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960) (noting that the decision “swept the country”). 
288 Robert W. Miller, Significant New Concepts of Tort Liability—Strict Liability, 17 SYRACUSE L. REV. 25, 29 
(1965) (quoting American Law Institute Meeting, 32 U.S. L. WEEK 2623, 2627 (1964)).  
289 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (stating that the seller of a product 
will be held liable even if it “has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of [its] product”).  
290 The adoption of strict products liability during the period extending from the early 1960s through the mid-1980s 
was but one of several changes in tort doctrine during this period that made it easier for personal injury claimants to 
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The causal connection between technological change in the economy and the emergence 
of strict products liability was unambiguously described in the profound concurring opinion of a 
then-young California Supreme Court Justice, Roger Traynor, in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling 
Co.,291 decided in 1941.  Justice Traynor contended that a manufacturer should be held liable to 
an injured consumer even without proof of negligence, in part because of the difficulty the 
injured consumer typically experienced in proving that the manufacturer was negligent: 
As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and 
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer 
of a product has been altered.  Manufacturing processes … are ordinarily either 
inaccessible to or beyond the ken of the general public.  The consumer no longer 
has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, 
… and his erstwhile vigilance has been lulled by the steady efforts of 
manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising … .292 
 
Traynor also wrote that the technologically induced changes in the economy meant that 
the manufacturer is in a better position to minimize losses by anticipating the risks posed by 
products and preventing repetitive injuries from such products.293  Finally, Justice Traynor 
recognized that the manufacturer is in a better position to spread the losses sustained by 
consumers: “The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming 
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the 
manufacturer and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.”294  By the mid-
                                                          
recover compensation, including notably the change from contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery to 
comparative fault and the total or partial abrogation of a number of common law immunities.  See VIRGINIA E. 
NOLAN & EDMUND URSIN, UNDERSTANDING ENTERPRISE LIABILITY 15 (1995) (noting that “enterprise liability 
scholars were appalled by the ‘harshness’” of doctrines such as “traditional landowner rules, the doctrines of 
charitable, governmental, and intrafamily immunity, and the defenses of assumption of the risk and contributory 
fault.”); Gifford & Jones, supra note 4, at 574–85 (2016) (identifying five doctrinal changes that occurred in many 
but not all jurisdictions during the late twentieth century as ones that enabled plaintiffs to more readily have their 
cases heard by juries).  However, the adoption of strict products liability was unusual because it explicitly returned 
the standard of liability to what was labeled as strict liability. 
291 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (contending that “a manufacturer incurs an absolute 
liability when an article that he has placed on the market … proves to have a defect that causes injury to human 
beings.”).  
292 Id. at 443.  
293 Id. at 443 (concluding that “[t]he consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the 
soundness of a product.”). 
294 Id. at 441.  
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1980s, virtually all American jurisdictions had adopted a strict liability standard in products 
cases.295 
3. The Reversion to Fault-Based Standards in Products Liability 
 
In fact, there was less to the apparent change from a negligence standard to a strict 
liability standard in products liability cases that occurred between the early1960s and the mid-
1980s than met the eye.  The early strict product liability cases were ones involving what is now 
known as a “manufacturing defect,” that is, “when the product departs from its intended 
design.”296  Schwartz argued, consistent with Justice Traynor’s “difficulty of proving 
negligence” rationale for strict product liability in Escola,297 that there is a high correlation 
between manufacturing defects and negligence.298   
Even if one accepts at face value the assertion that liability for manufacturing defects is 
decided under a “true strict liability”299 standard that sometimes produces different results from 
those under a negligence standard, the fact remains that a majority of products litigation involves 
“design” and “warning” defects, not manufacturing defects.300  In other words, even when a 
product “conforms to the intended design,” it might not be reasonably safe because “the intended 
design itself” or the lack of adequate instructions or warnings makes it unreasonably unsafe.301   
                                                          
295 See 3 HARPER ET AL., supra note 141, §28.15 n.7 (noting that at least 46 states have adopted strict products 
liability or its functional equivalent).  
296 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  See Richard L. Cupp Jr. 
& Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability Versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 874, 889 (2002) (stating that “[m]ost of the early cases applying strict liability in tort involved 
manufacturing defects rather than design defects or inadequate warnings.”).  
297 See supra note 292 and accompanying text.  
298 See Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and Possible End of The Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. 
REV. 601, 624 (1992) (arguing that strict liability does not “dramatically chang[e] … the pattern of litigation results 
… under a negligence standard”).    
299 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 283–84 (1998) (noting that the standard of 
liability for manufacturing defects contained in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability originates with 
contract law).  
300 See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRINCIPLES OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY 85 n.1 (2006) (finding that in a 1985 study of 
products liability claims over $100,000, the majority were based on design defects). 
301 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §1, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
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In the early years of strict product liability, courts focused on manufacturing defects.302  
In the comparatively infrequent number of cases in which the issue arose, courts typically 
addressed the issue of whether a design defect was present through the lens of the “consumer 
expectations test,303 that is, whether the product was “dangerous to an extent beyond that which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it.”304  By the mid-1970s, 
however, courts began to move toward the “risk-utility” test for determining whether there is a 
design defect that provides that such a defect existed only if the costs of taking additional 
precautions is less than the “probability and seriousness of harm” that would be prevented.305  
The risk-utility test, of course, is a version of the cost-benefit analysis or “Hand formula”306 that 
defines negligence.  In short, the risk-utility test for design defects marks a return to a negligence 
                                                          
302 Id. (stating that “[i]mposition of liability for design defects … was relatively infrequent until the late 1960s and 
early 1970s).  
303 See OWEN, supra note 282, § 5.6, at 292–99.   
304 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A, cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also id. at cmt. g (stating that strict 
liability “applies only where the product is … in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will 
be unreasonably dangerous to him.”).   The consumer expectations test, with its origins in the law of warranty, see 
OWEN, supra note 282, at 291, does not require negligence on the part of the manufacturer or other seller, and 
therefore can legitimately be classified as a form of strict liability.  However, courts soon encountered a variety of 
problems in applying the consumer expectations test, notably the vagueness of the test, particularly when jurors 
applied it to technologically complex products.   Id. at 29.  See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806, 809 
(Or. 1967) (stating that a jury would have to speculate how a 5-to-6-inch rock would normally damage a truck 
traveling on a highway because “[h]igh-speed collisions with large rocks are not so common … that the average 
person would know from personal experience what to expect under the circumstances.”). 
305 Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976).  The risk-utility test involves “a balancing of the 
probability and seriousness of harm against the costs of taking precautions.  Relevant factors to be considered 
include the availability of alternative designs, the cost and feasibility of adopting alternative designs and the 
frequency or infrequency of injury resulting from the design.”  Id.  (citations omitted). 
306 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, L., J.) (describing the cost-
benefit test for negligence using algebraic terms); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR 
PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2010) (stating that “[p]rimary factors to consider in 
ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s 
conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to 
eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”); Posner, supra note 153, at 32–34 (endorsing “Learned Hand’s famous 
formulation”).   
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standard.307  In 1998, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopted a variant of 
the risk-utility test for design defects,308 and today most courts follow the risk-utility approach.309 
Similarly, the law governing warning defects also has largely returned to a negligence 
standard.  The Restatement (Third), for example, indicates that a warning defect exists only 
“when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings.”310 The Restatement reporters observed that 
“[a]n overwhelming majority of jurisdictions supports the proposition that a manufacturer has a 
duty to warn only of risks that were known or should have been known to a reasonable 
person.”311  This same basic principle inheres in what became known as the “state-of-the-art” 
defense,312 under which compliance with “the level of scientific and technological knowledge 
existing at the time the product in question was designed for manufacture” is generally regarded 
as either a total bar to liability or at least a factor that the jury could consider in deciding whether 
a product was defective.313  The state of the art defense essentially turns strict liability for failure 
to warn into negligence for failure to warn.  In any event, courts and commentators usually agree 
that today, liability in negligence for failure to warn and under a strict liability warning defect 
                                                          
307 In the 1960s, John Wade and W. Page Keeton each independently argued that the distinction between negligence 
and strict product liability should be that under strict liability, knowledge of a product risk, even if it were not 
reasonably foreseeable, should be imputed to the manufacturer.  See W. Page Keeton, Products Liability—
Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEX. L. REV. 398, 404 (1970); John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 
19 SW. L.J. 5, 15 (1965); see also Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng’r Co., 386 A.2d 816, 826–27 (N.J. 1978) (adopting 
principle).  Over the longer term, however, this view has rarely prevailed. See infra notes 312–316 and 
accompanying text.  
308 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998) (adopting standard of risk-
utility analysis with a requirement of an available “reasonable alternative design” that would make the product 
safer).  
309 See OWEN, supra note 282, at 299 (reporting that (reporting that “most courts … use some form of ‘risk-utility’ 
… test).   
310 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c).  
311 Id. at cmt. m. (citing leading cases).  
312 True strict liability in warning cases would mean that manufacturers could be held liable if they failed to warn of 
a risk of which they neither were aware nor reasonably should have been aware.   See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-
Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 546–47 (N.J. 1982) (holding manufacturer liable for failure to warn of 
unknowable risks because of the risk-distribution goal of strict product liability).  However, decisions imposing this 
type of strict liability in warning cases usually did not last long.  See e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 
386 (N.J. 1984) (stating that pharmaceutical manufacturer’s “conduct should be measured by knowledge at the time 
the manufacturer distributed the product.”). 
313 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1346–47 (Conn. 1997) (discussing application of state of 
the art in warning and defect cases). 
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claim are essentially coterminous.314  Additionally, in design defect cases, the requirement that 
the plaintiff prove the availability of a reasonable alternative design315 in effect brings state of 
the art back into the equation as a complete defense: the Restatement defines “reasonable” in this 
context to mean “technologically feasible and practical.”316   
By the mid-1980s, the reaction against “strict” products liability spread from the judicial 
arena to state and federal legislative halls.317  Legislators perceived, accurately or not, that strict 
products liability imperiled the activities of product manufacturers and distributors that they 
deemed to possess great social utility.318  The less common variety of tort reform statutes 
restricted the circumstances in which victims were able to recover from defendants,319 while 
more widespread statutory reforms limited the amount of damages that a successful claimant 
could recover from a manufacturer.320  
4. Assessing the Product Liability “Revolution”  
 
In and of itself, the early twentieth-century decision in MacPherson321 marked a dramatic 
change in the American law governing personal injuries by expanding the duty of care owed by 
                                                          
314 See, e.g., Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 561 (Cal. 1991) (Mosk, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (stating that “[i]n no area of strict products liability has the impact of … negligence become more 
pronounced than in failure-to-warn cases.”); Gourdine v. Crews, 955 A.2d 769, 782 (Md. 2008) (observing that 
“negligence concepts and those of strict liability have ‘morphed together’ … in failure to warn cases.”).  
315 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1998).  
316 Id. at cmt. f.  
317 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Products Liability and Economic Activity: An Empirical Analysis of Tort Reform’s 
Impact on Businesses, Employment, and Production, 66 VAND. L. REV. 257, 258–59 (2013) (reporting that tort 
reform advocates “have won numerous victories as legislatures continue to enact reforms that reduce the scope of 
products liability.”). 
318 E.g., National Childhood Vaccine-Injury Compensation Act: Hearing on S. 2117 Before the S. Comm. on Labor 
and Human Resources, 98th Cong. 49, at 4 (1984) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy) (arguing that “[w]e must be 
able to get vaccines to children … at an acceptable cost and without creating exorbitant and unpredictable legal 
difficulties. … We cannot tolerate a system which discourages immunization”). 
319 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7001 (2016) (providing a “sealed container defense” for product sellers); IDAHO 
CODE § 6–1403 (2016) (permitting recovery only during the “useful safe life” of the product, usually ten years); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010 (LexisNexis 2016) (barring products liability for sellers of used products).    
320 E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (LexisNexis 2013) (mandating that courts deduct the amount of compensation 
received from collateral sources in some circumstances); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11–108 (LexisNexis 
2013) (capping noneconomic damages in personal injury cases at $500,000 in 1994 with a $15,000 annual 
incremental increase thereafter); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.925 (West 2013) (prohibiting punitive damages in 
products liability cases).   
321 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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manufacturers and other possible defendants to all foreseeable victims of their negligence.  
Additionally, in the 1960s and the 1970s, most courts replaced the heretofore dominant 
negligence regime with a standard of strict liability for product liability cases, at least in cases 
involving manufacturing defects, the type of product defects that had almost exclusively 
dominated claims until that point.  These two changes, marking significant modification of the 
preexisting negligence regime, resulted largely from the difficulty of proving liability in a 
products cases under the ex-ante negligence standard.  In the early years of strict products 
liability, there can be little doubt that these changes increased the frequency of product liability 
claims, even if the issue of whether this growth in claims continued into the 1980s is strongly 
contested.322     
The subsequent extension of true strict liability to design and warning defects met with 
far less success and sparked a substantial reversion to the preexisting negligence regime.  The 
more restrictive court decisions and legislative enactments beginning in the 1980s reflected the 
arguments of manufacturers and their insurers that the increases in the aggregate liability they 
faced as a result of strict product liability stifled economic activity, drove companies out of 
business, and prevented products from coming to the market.323  As was the case a century 
earlier when courts cut back on the liability exposure of railroads and other industries, 
legislatures, in particular, acted on the belief that the social utility of these defendants’ activities 
justified decreasing their liability exposure.  The net result, at least for liability exposure 
                                                          
322 Compare Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 731, 748–49 (1992) (observing a decline in both the number of product liability claims filed and 
plaintiff success rates in the 1980s), with Shepherd, supra note 317, at 266–67 (reporting an increase in products 
liability cases commenced in federal court from 2,393 in 1975 to 14,145 in 1987, and further stipulating that “this 
number drastically underestimates the true number of products liability claims because many tort claims are brought 
in state courts”).  
323 See, e.g., Product Liability Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS'N, http://www.atra.org/ issue/product-liability/ (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2017); Torts of the Future, U.S. CHAMBER: INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM (Mar. 29, 2017), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/research/torts-of-the-future; Legal Policy & Product Safety, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF MFRS., http://www.nam.org/Issues/Legal-Policy-and-Product-Safety/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2017).  
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resulting from design and warning defects, is that for the most part, the so-called “products 
liability revolution” now appears to have been largely a faux revolution.   
 
IV.   The Association between Technological Progress and Changes in the Law of  
 Personal Injury Compensation 
 
The substantial changes in tort doctrine described in this Article indicate an association 
between technological and doctrinal change.  New waves of technology and the changes in the 
economy that come with them result in varying (1) frequencies of personal injuries, (2) severities 
of such injuries, (3) degrees of difficulty in proving claims for compensation, and (4) magnitudes 
of social utility.  Analysis of these factors determines whether the ex-ante rules governing 
liability for personal injuries are likely to change and, specifically, whether the new doctrinal 
structure governing liability will be based on common-law fault (negligence), common-law strict 
liability, or a legislatively-mandated no fault compensation system that limits damages 
recoverable by claimants.   
The first factor is the frequency of personal injuries resulting from the widespread 
adoption of a new wave of technologies.  For example, the technological changes of the mid-
and-late nineteenth century likely increased the frequency of personal injuries and certainly 
increased the frequency of nontrivial injuries leading to legal claims.324  As the complexity of the 
machinery causing injury increased, the result was a greater likelihood that the operation of the 
machinery would malfunction.  Moreover, because accidents involving machinery were much 
more likely than those during the preindustrial era to result in severe injuries, a higher percentage 
of injured victims filed claims.  
The second factor, the severity of the resulting injuries, is an even more important 
determinant of doctrinal change.  As the level of technology continually advanced from the first 
                                                          
324 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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half of the nineteenth century through the first half of the twentieth century, injuries became 
more severe.325  Locomotives, automobiles, and industrial machinery were more likely to result 
in crippling or even fatal injuries than were horses that threw a rider or the carelessness of co-
workers using hand-tools.  
The third technologically-inspired factor impacting the tort liability standard is the 
difficulty that victims experience in proving claims against the tortfeasors whose conduct caused 
the injuries.  For example, it was more difficult for a worker employed in a massive factory or 
working for a railroad to prove both causation and fault than it was for a victim injured by a co-
worker in an early nineteenth-century craft shop.  Similarly, it is even more difficult to establish 
causation and fault in a products liability case when the harm was caused by a product 
manufactured at a factory distant in location, and possibly distant in time as well.   
The product of the frequency of additional paid claims resulting from a new set of 
technological changes times the mean severity of these paid claims yields the amount of the 
societal increase in the aggregate liability exposure of tortfeasors.  The frequency of paid claims 
is affected not only by the frequency of personal injuries, but also by the difficulty of proving the 
claim.  The greater the difficulty, the less the liability exposure of tortfeasors.  
The fourth and final variable affecting tort liability is the change in social utility resulting 
from each new wave of technological innovation.  To the extent that courts and legislatures 
perceive that new technologies offer great social utility, they are less likely to either impose strict 
liability or require the tortfeasor to fully compensate the victim for all damages.  
Obviously, the first, second, and fourth factors echo the variables incorporated in Judge 
Learned Hand’s quasi-algebraic formula for determining whether any particular defendant’s or 
plaintiff’s conduct was negligent, but apply these same variables to the aggregate changes in the 
economy caused by a new set of technological and technologically-inspired economic 
                                                          
325 See supra notes 82–87, 91–92, and accompanying text. 
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changes.326  The third factor, the difficulty of proving liability in the face of new technological 
developments, is suggested by Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co.327   
It is not clear in the abstract which direction any increase in either of the first two factors, 
the frequency or severity of personal injuries, pushes the liability standard.  On one hand, an 
increase in the frequency of personal injuries is likely to lead to demands to ease the ability of 
victims to recover compensation.  For example, the increased number of injuries among workers 
resulting from the proliferation of railroads and factories led to the enactment of workers’ 
compensation.328  On the other hand, a greater frequency of personal injury claims also increases 
the aggregate liability exposure of tortfeasors engaged in productive activities benefiting society. 
This factor, pointing toward the tightening the requirements for liability, proved decisive when 
the negligence regime replaced the ex-ante strict liability standard after the Industrial 
Revolution.329   
Similarly, an increase in the severity of the resulting injuries points in two different 
directions regarding a change in liability standard.  Society and its judges perceive victims with 
more severe injuries, such as the smashing of bones following the Industrial Revolution, as more 
in need of compensation than those that suffered less serious injuries resulting from older 
technologies.  Again, however, an increased severity of injuries likewise magnifies the liability 
exposure of those perceived to be engaged in productive activities.  
                                                          
326 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (suggesting that “if the probability be 
called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P; i.e., 
whether B[is] less than PL.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 3 (2010) (providing that the “primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person’s conduct lacks 
reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the foreseeable severity 
of any harm that may ensued, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”).  
327 See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
328 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.  
329 See supra notes 196–202, and accompanying text. 
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Any increase in the difficulty of proving the ex-ante requirements of liability resulting 
from new technologies points in favor of lessening the difficulties of proof.   Thus, this factor 
typically points toward the adoption of either a common-law strict liability or no-fault 
compensation system, in either event abrogating the plaintiff’s need to prove fault on the part of 
the tortfeasor.  The choice between the two is likely determined by the synergistic effect between 
the difficulty-of-proof and severity-of-claims factors.  With larger claims, such as cases 
involving product-liability manufacturing defects, the difficulty in proving the claim may point 
toward common-law strict liability.  However, in claims where the ratio of the difficulty of 
proving the claim is high compared to the severity of the claim, difficulty of proof points toward 
a no-fault compensation system.  This factor helps explain why social reformers and advocates 
for workers generally favored the adoption of workers’ compensation, which eliminated the need 
for the victim to prove that the employer both caused the accident and acted with fault.330 
The whole point of new technologies is to increase social utility, so the social utility 
factor generally points toward tightening the liability standards, that is, maintaining or 
strengthening the requirements for proof of fault.   
Each successive wave of society-wide technological change in American history ruptured 
the fabric of the preexisting liability system.   The mid-nineteenth century technological changes 
spawned by the Industrial Revolution, most notably the development of railroads, appear to have 
resulted in (1) an increased frequency of injuries that victims deemed worthy of attempts to seek 
compensation, (2) a significant increase in the severity of the harms, (3) an increased difficulty 
for victims proving their claims, and (4) the perception that the locomotives and other new 
industrial machinery greatly contributed to social utility.  By themselves, the first three factors 
                                                          
330 See WITT, supra note 32, at 170 (stating that the workers’ compensation system “sought to make employers liable 




might have led to a societal consensus that the rules governing liability should be loosened to 
more readily enable recovery.  However, courts, buttressed by the contemporary consensus that 
technology was the key to progress,331 acted in a way suggesting they found that the social utility 
of new technologies outweighed the need to compensate the increased number of victims 
suffering substantially more severe injuries than in the preindustrial era.  The weighing of the 
four factors is inherently a political choice, and here Horwitz and Friedman are correct in 
focusing on the shift in distributional consequences (from industrial tortfeasors to workers and 
other victims) resulting from the change from a strict liability standard to a negligence regime.332  
A few decades later, legislatures reevaluated these same four factors following the 
development of the factory system and the proliferation of railroads and industrial machinery.333  
In this instance, the (1) increased frequency of personal injuries resulting from these changes in 
the economic system brought about by new technologies and (2) the difficulty of proving that the 
employer acted with negligence, both pointed toward loosening the requirements for liability and 
adopting a no-fault or strict liability system.   
It might have been expected that employers would vigorously oppose the adoption of a 
no-fault workers’ compensation system.  However, many employers promoted the adoption of 
workers’ compensation because of their fear that the fellow-servant rule, a key component of the 
classical negligence regime,334 was about to collapse.  If that had happened, employers’ liability 
exposure within the common-law system, with the concomitant power of juries to award full 
damages including difficult-to-control noneconomic damages,335 would have increased 
dramatically.  These employers convinced legislators of the need to limit the anticipated increase 
                                                          
331 See supra notes 70–73, and accompanying text. 
332 See supra notes 156–159, and accompanying text. 
333 See supra notes 210–213, and accompanying text. 
334 See supra note 215 and accompanying text.  
335 See, e.g., Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337, 345–46 (Cal. 1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting) 
(discussing “arbitrary” nature of jury awards for pain and suffering); Geressy v. Digital Equip. Corp., 980 F. Supp. 
640, 656–57 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (describing the “variability” of jury awards).  
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in their aggregate liability exposure so as to not threaten the social utility of their enterprises.336  
The way to do this was to limit the severity of claims paid through the workers’ compensation 
system, making the aggregate liability exposure more predictable and less than what employers 
feared would happen if the fellow-servant rule was abolished.  
Much like railroads and factories, the development of automobiles affected a change in 
tort liability.  Their widespread use led to an onslaught of accidents and a dramatic increase in 
the frequency of injuries.  Coupled with laws mandating requiring insurance coverage, the result 
was a dramatic increase in the frequency of claims.  The severity of these resulting claims varied 
widely, but even with larger claims, the amount paid was almost always limited by insurance 
policy limits.  As a result, the severity of paid claims was modest.  The difficulty of proving 
negligence in any given case varied widely, but tended to be substantial when compared with the 
amount of the expected recovery.  This reality, combined with the high frequency of claims, led 
to the adoption of formal no-fault plans in a minority of states.  In most jurisdictions, however, 
the negligence regime formally remained intact, but in fact insurance claims adjusters and 
specialized plaintiffs’ attorneys routinized the settlement process, deemphasized the role of fault, 
and assessed damages in a formulaic manner, all of which resemble a no-fault compensation 
system more than they do the traditional tort litigation system.   
Tracing how changes in liability standards for product manufacturers and suppliers 
resulted from the development of the mass production/mass consumption society is more 
difficult, because the changes took place in different decades, pointed in opposite directions, and 
indeed were adopted by different branches of government.  The mass production society 
increased both the frequency and severity of personal injuries, but most importantly, also 
increased the difficulty of a victim proving that the manufacturer or other distributor caused the 
                                                          
336 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
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harm and was at fault.337  Until the legislative and judicial backlash that began in the 1970s, the 
difficulty-of-proof factor was the deciding factor in judicial opinions and resulted in significant 
changes in the law from the negligence regime toward a strict-liability standard, including both 
the abrogation of the privity limitation338 and the abolition of the need to prove the 
manufacturer’s fault in cases involving manufacturing defects.339  By the 1980s, however, courts 
and especially legislatures became persuaded that the increased liability exposure of product 
manufacturers and distributors threatened their ongoing activities, which were perceived to be of 
great social utility.  Most courts functionally returned to a negligence-standard to govern design 
defect and warning defect cases, and legislatures imposed a variety of limitations on the liability 
exposure of product sellers including ones affecting either the frequency of successful claims340 
or the severity of such claims.341 
V.  The Second American Technological Revolution—Autonomous Vehicles, 
Robots, and Artificial Intelligence—and the Future of Liability Law  
 
American society is in the midst of the second great technological revolution, one 
characterized by autonomous vehicles, robots, networked medical devices, and artificial 
intelligence.  The Industrial Revolution replaced humans and animals as suppliers of physical 
force with machines.342  In the new technological revolution, the contemporaneous decision-
making that directs the physical force that is capable of inflicting personal injury is transferred 
from human beings to machines.343   
                                                          
337 See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
338 See supra notes 283–287, and accompanying text. 
339 See supra notes 296–298, and accompanying text. 
340 See supra note 319 and accompanying text; see also Shepherd, supra note 283, at 269–71 (describing the 
legislative “attack on products liability law” during the 1980s). 
341 See supra note 320.   
342 See supra notes 27–30, 78-81, and accompanying texts.  
343 See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
117, 120 (2014) (“[T]he machine functions and makes decisions in ways that can be traced directly back to the design, 
programming, and knowledge humans embedded in the machine.”); see also Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving 
and Product Liability, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 47 (2017) (using a minor crash between a Google autonomous car 
and a bus to illustrate the same point).  However, Ryan Calo notes that “[r]obotics increasingly display emergent 
behavior, meaning behavior that … cannot be anticipated in advance by operators.”  RYAN CALO, CENTER FOR 
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Robots and other machines where human-decision making is, at a minimum, removed in 
time from the operation of the machines, already cause deaths and injuries.344  For example, 
according to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, robots caused at least thirty-
eight American workplace deaths and injuries between 1984 and 2014.345  Both industrial and 
surgical robots have caused injuries resulting in personal injury lawsuits against their 
manufacturers.346 Autonomous vehicles, however, pose the greatest challenge to preexisting tort 
law in the twenty-first century. For this reason, I focus here on autonomous vehicles and the 
coming revolution in tort law that will result.  
Autonomous vehicle technologies enable the vehicle itself to make the decisions 
necessary for safe operation.347 Vehicles already on the market today include such automated 
features as lane-departure warnings, cruise control that senses the presence of other vehicles and 
adjusts accordingly, crash warning features, and automated parking technology.348  Fully 
autonomous vehicles, currently under development and expected to be available to consumers on 
a widespread basis by 2021349 will enable the driver to “cede full control of all safety-critical 
                                                          
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AT BROOKINGS, THE CASE FOR A FEDERAL ROBOTICS COMMISSION 5 (2014), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/RoboticsCommissionR2_Calo.pdf.  See also Calo, Robots in 
American Law 40 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 2016-04, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2737598 (describing “emergence” as the ability of robots “that do 
not need to be programmed to solve tasks, at least not in the same way as an entirely bounded system[,]” but instead 
can “behave in complex, unanticipated ways.”).   
344 See Balkin, supra note 1, at 46 (“Robots will … break people’s limbs”); Calo, supra note 2, at 515, 534 
(describing robotics as “the next transformative technology” that acts on the world physically and possesses “the 
capacity to do physical harm”).   
345 See Accident Search Results: “Robot”, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 
https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/AccidentSearch.search?acc_keyword=%22Robot%22&keyword_list=on (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2017) (listing accidents involving robots). 
346 See e.g., Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, No. 96-2248, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 13571 (8th Cir. June 9, 1997) 
(alleging negligence and strict liability against manufacturer of industrial robot that killed the robot operator and 
programmer); In re Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1339 (J.P.M.L. 2012) (evaluating the merits of 
class action certification for “personal injuries arising out of alleged defects in the da Vinci Robotic Surgical 
System.”); Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 389 P.3d 517, 530 (Wash. 2017) (holding manufacturer of robotic 
medical device liable for severe injuries and eventual death of patient inflicted by the device following a 
prostatectomy). 
347 See NIDHI KALRA ET AL., LIABILITY AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES 1 (RAND 
2009), http://www.dot.ca.gov/newtech/researchreports/reports/2009/prr-2009-
28_liability_reg_&_auto_vehicle_final_report_2009.pdf.   
348 Id.  




functions under certain traffic or environmental conditions”350 or even “for an entire trip.”351  
These vehicles use GPS-tracking and Lidar (laser-based sensing devices) to detect stationary and 
other moving objects in all directions.352 In addition, major car manufacturers are developing 
vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure technologies that will, for example, enable 
autonomous vehicles to communicate with one another.353 
If everyone owned and operated an autonomous vehicle, the frequency of personal 
injuries resulting from auto accidents would be very substantially reduced, probably by ninety 
percent or more.354  In the decades before such full-market penetration, the reduction in the 
frequency of personal injury accidents, while still substantial, will be much less.355  In contrast, 
the severity of injuries resulting from accidents involving autonomous vehicles is likely to be 
much greater than those currently caused by automobiles, because the autonomous vehicles are 
projected to be traveling at much greater speeds and in closer proximity to one another.356  Even 
                                                          
(reporting that BMW projects their fully autonomous cars to be available by 2021); Edward Taylor & Paul Lienert, 
Autonomous Cars Race Narrows on Doubts About Clear Path to Profit, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-autos-autonomous-bmw-idUSKBN1AO0Y7 (reporting that Intel projects a 
similar timeframe).  
350 In its 2013 “Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles,” the National Highway 
Transportation Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) established five levels of automation for vehicles.  NATIONAL 
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY CONCERNING AUTOMATED VEHICLES 5, 
https://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated_Vehicles_Policy.pdf.  The language quoted here is 
from what NHTSA classifies as a “Level 3” vehicle.  Id. at 5.  
351 Id. (quoting NHTSA’s criteria for a “Level 4” vehicle).  See also Daniel A. Crane et al., A Survey of Legal Issues 
Arising from The Deployment of Autonomous and Connected Vehicles, 23 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 
202 (2017) (defining an “‘autonomous vehicle’ … [as] a vehicle equipped with NHTSA level 3 or 4 technology.”).  
352 Crane et al., supra note 351, at 198. 
353 Id. at 205–06.  
354 See, e.g., The Internet of Cars: Joint Hearing Before the H Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform Subcomm. on 
Info. Tech. and Subcomm. on Transp. and Pub. Assets, 114th Cong. (2015), https://oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/11-18-2015-Joint-Subcommittee-Hearing-on-Internet-of-Cars-Garfield-ITI-Testimony.pdf 
(prepared statement of Dean C. Garfield, President and CEO of the Information Technology Industry Council) 
(projecting that “automated vehicles can prevent up to 90 percent” of all automobile accidents); see also Neal 
Katyal, Disruptive Technologies and the Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688 (2014) (reporting that “researchers predict 
fatality rates could ultimately fall to 1% of current rates”).  
355 See Crane et al., supra note 351, at 301 (noting that “[i]t does no good if one’s vehicle is fully autonomous if a 
vehicle in close proximity is driven by a reckless … driver.”); cf., Smith, supra note 343, at 6 (criticizing, implicitly, 
NHTSA’s “analysis of the safety benefits of vehicle-to-vehicle communication … [for] assum[ing] universal 
adoption”). But cf. Katyal, supra note 354, at 1688 (observing that “[e]ven if autonomous vehicles constituted only 
10% of total cars on the road, it would save 1,100 lives per year.”).   
356 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 21 (conjecturing “that autonomous vehicle technologies are remarkably 
effective at virtually eliminating minor crashes caused by human error … but … that the comparatively few crashes 
that do occur usually result in very serious injuries or fatalities”).  But see Smith, supra note 343, at 19 (suggesting 
that autonomous vehicles “may crash … less severely”).  If the severity of the losses inflicted by autonomous 
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if the mean severity of claims increases, however, the aggregate cost of personal injuries 
resulting from accidents involving autonomous vehicles is expected to be considerably less than 
the current costs of automobile accidents because of the sizable decrease in the frequency of 
accidents.357 
The substitution of autonomous vehicles for current automobiles and trucks will 
dramatically shift the distribution of which parties are legally liable for personal injuries 
resulting from accidents and hence which parties will pay for such liability, presumably through 
higher insurance premiums.  Automobile drivers and owners, and their insurers, currently pay the 
bulk of the costs of personal injuries resulting from accidents.358  Drivers are in control of their 
vehicles, and injured parties must prove that they were negligent to recover.359  In contrast, with 
autonomous vehicles, the driver is not in control and cannot be held liable for negligence, except 
perhaps for unreasonably deciding to take control of a partially autonomous vehicle360 or for 
unreasonably failing to maintain an autonomous vehicle.  Instead, the bulk of the liability will 
fall on the manufacturers of autonomous vehicles colliding with one another361 or the parties 
responsible for maintaining and mapping the surrounding infrastructure for autonomous vehicles, 
including assuring the presence of clear lane markings, uniform road markings and signs, and the 
                                                          
vehicles is greater than those currently resulting from automobile accidents, loss distribution considerations suggest 
either a liability regime that does not require proof of fault or first-party insurance with higher limits than current 
automobile policies.  See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 
YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1961) (noting that “taking a large sum of money from one person is more likely to result in 
economic dislocation … than taking a series of small sums from many people”).  
357 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 19, 34 (anticipating lower insurance costs).  
358 See Crane et al., supra note 351, at 20 (stating that at the present time, “we commonly speak of crashes as being 
caused by one or more at-fault drivers.”).  
359 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 20 (noting that “[c]urrently, … we ascribe blame to one or more drivers 
rather than to design features of the car.”).  When the harm resulting from automobile accidents is minor and falls 
within statutorily defined categories, no-fault liability applies in a minority of jurisdictions. See ANDERSON ET AL., 
supra note 242, at 35 (describing coverage of a variety of no-fault plans).   
360 The driver is able to assume control of what NHTSA defines as a Level 3 autonomous vehicle.  See supra note 
350 and accompanying text.  
361 See Crane et al., supra note 351, at 256 (predicting that the proliferation of autonomous vehicles will result in a 
decrease in pricing of traditional automobile insurance and an increase in manufacturers’ product liability 
premiums); KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 34 (concluding that “manufacturer liability is expected to increase”); 
Smith, supra note 343, at 53 (noting that automobile manufacturers “are likely to be liable for a much greater share 
of the costs of crashes involving automated driving systems”). 
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external hardware and software necessary for vehicle-to-vehicle communications.362  States and 
localities and their contractors will be responsible for this infrastructure.363 
It will probably be much more difficult for the plaintiff injured in an accident involving 
autonomous vehicles than it is for today’s victim of an automobile accident to prove which party 
or parties “caused the accident” and whether they were at fault.364  The evidence likely will 
consist of “lines of code” rather than “broken mechanical parts”365 and require expert testimony.  
Additionally, unless the law changes, the injured victim will need to prove that a particular 
defendant engaged in tortious conduct that was a factual cause of the injury.366  Proving factual 
causation is usually fairly easy in today’s routine automobile accident, but once autonomous-
vehicle-to-autonomous-vehicle accidents become the norm, investigators and jurors will be 
required to disentangle the electronic impulses from two or more vehicles, the response or lack 
of response from the infrastructure coordinating communications among vehicles, and perhaps 
the acts or omissions of drivers who took control of their vehicles unwisely or who failed to do 
so, in order to establish which parties were factual causes of the accident.367  If there is a 
significant possibility that one of the vehicles malfunctioned, the manufacturers of component 
parts, including software designers, join those whose actions or omissions may have contributed 
to the accident.   
                                                          
362 See Crane et al., supra note 351, at 306–09 (describing infrastructure changes necessary for autonomous vehicles 
including– the external Security Credential Management System (‘SCMS’) necessary to operate vehicle-to-vehicle 
communications and the resulting liability exposure of governments; suggesting also that localities may contract 
with private partners to undertake these tasks).   
363 Id.  
364 See Vladeck, supra note 343, at 145 (concluding that “the complexity and sophistication of driver-less cars, and 
the complications that will come with the fact patterns that are likely to arise, are going to make proof of 
wrongdoing in any individual case extremely difficult.”).  
365 See Crane et al., supra note 350, at 256.  
366 In carefully circumscribed circumstances, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving that a particular 
tortfeasor was a factual cause of the plaintiff’s injury.  See Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual 
Causation Requirement in Mass Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 900–15 (2005).  
367 See Ujjayini Bose, Note, The Black Box Solution to Autonomous Liability, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1325, 1335, 
1338 (2015) (noting that “it may be difficult to separate autonomous system malfunctions from driver negligence”; 
further noting that the driver may be liable for maintenance of the vehicle and for failing to take over the driving, or 
doing so unreasonably, in emergency situations).  
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Determining which parties’ conduct may have been factual causes of the accident only 
brings the victim of an accident part way to the goal of proving liability, which also requires 
proof of facts establishing tortious conduct.  Here, the liability of drivers368 and, under current 
law, software engineers,369 will both require proof of negligence. The manufacturers of the 
autonomous vehicles and their component parts (excluding software) might be held liable on a 
strict liability basis, but even there, most jurisdictions require that a plaintiff prove the existence 
of a design defect through the negligence-like risk-utility test to hold the manufacturer liable.370  
A party whose conduct is both tortious and a cause of the accident involving autonomous 
vehicles might be held liable in either of two ways depending on how the technology of 
autonomous vehicles develops.  In an accident with autonomous vehicles employing vehicle-to-
vehicle communication, the electronic “paper trail” following an accident might reveal whether it 
was one of the autonomous vehicles, its driver, or the infrastructure that malfunctioned.371  In the 
absence of such devices, even if the plaintiff cannot prove which party(ies) engaged in tortious 
conduct contributing to the accident, some courts might find all parties jointly and severally 
liable under the doctrine of alternative liability.372 
As noted previously,373 an important consequence of the replacement of driver-operated 
vehicles with autonomous vehicles is likely to be a shift in legal liability for the bulk of accident 
                                                          
368 See supra note 359 and accompanying text.  
369 See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally Come, 67 MD. L. 
REV. 425, 469 (2008) (reporting that “[t]o date, there are no reported decisions  … holding a software vendor liable 
under a strict liability theory.”).  
370 Even proving that an autonomous vehicle is defective would be difficult.  David Vladeck suggests that “[t]he 
only feasible approach … would be to infer a defect of some kind on the theory that the accident itself is proof of 
defect, … which is simply a restatement of res ipsa loquitor.”  Vladeck, supra note 343, at 128.  
371 One commentator has suggested that manufacturers could protect themselves from unwarranted liability if each 
autonomous vehicle is equipped with an “Event Data Recorder … analogous to the Flight Data Recorders …  
colloquially known as a ‘black box,’ found on airplanes.”).  Bose, supra note 367, at 1326.  Insurance companies 
already offer the prospect of lower insurance premiums for those drivers that agree to incorporate monitoring 
devices into their vehicles that track driving performance. See Ron Lieber, Lower Your Car Insurance Bill, at the 
Price of Some Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/your-money/auto-
insurance/tracking-gadgets-could-lower-your-car-insurance-at-the-price-of-some-privacy.html. 
372 See, e.g., Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1474 (10th Cir. 1988) (shifting burden to defendant 
manufacturers to prove absence of factual causation); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W. 2d 164, 176–77 (Mich. 
1984) (shifting the burden to defendant manufacturers under the alternative liability theory).  
373 See supra notes 360-361, and accompanying text.  
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costs from drivers to vehicle-manufacturers.  Obviously, this will have significant implications 
for liability insurance.  Automobile insurance premiums will plummet because legal liability for 
most of the accident costs now covered by liability and collision insurance will be transferred to 
vehicle manufacturers.374  Once a manufacturer has sold a vehicle, however, there probably is no 
practical way for the manufacturer to be reimbursed for its ongoing, annual insurance premiums 
covering the expected liability.  Hence, the distribution of autonomous vehicles from 
manufacturers to consumers probably will be altered in one or more of several ways.  First, if the 
autonomous vehicle is sold to an individual driver, the upfront purchase price will include the 
present discounted value of the amounts the manufacturer expects to spend during the useful life 
of the autonomous vehicle on accident costs, through either insurance premiums or self-
insurance.375  Second, the manufacturer’s liability for the costs of accidents involving 
autonomous vehicles makes it more likely that the vehicles will be leased, rather than sold, and 
that annual lease payments will include the manufacturer’s expected liability costs.376  Third, 
today’s norm of privately-owned automobiles may be replaced with a system in which 
ridesharing businesses such as Uber or Lyft own the vast majority of autonomous vehicles and 
provide transportation for private parties on an individual-ride basis.377  The recent proliferation 
of partnerships among ridesharing businesses, automobile manufacturers, and software 
corporations is no coincidence.378 
Let us now apply the four factors considered in Part IV to accidents involving 
autonomous vehicles: 
                                                          
374 See Crane et al., supra note 350, at 49, 256 (concluding that “[t]he most likely outcome is that premiums for 
driver liability coverage, as well as first-party health and lost-income coverage  … will decline”); KALRA ET AL., 
supra note 347, at 21 (anticipating lower insurance premiums for owners of autonomous vehicles). 
375 See Smith, supra note 343, at 57 (finding that “[t]he price of automated driving products and services will reflect 
the product liability exposure of that industry.”).  
376 Id. at 62 (analyzing liability costs if autonomous vehicles are leased).  
377 Id. at 65, 68 (outlining the advantages of a service-model for autonomous vehicles that would substitute for 
private ownership of vehicles). 
378 See, e.g., KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 194 (reporting on General Motors’ purchase of Cruise Automation for 




(1) The frequency of accidents resulting from the proliferation of autonomous vehicles 
will be dramatically decreased from the current frequency of automobile accidents.379 
 
(2) The severity of the remaining accidents likely will be greater than those resulting 
from current automobile accidents.380  
 
However, the aggregate liability exposure (frequency times severity) will still be 
considerably less than under the current system.381 
 
(3) The difficulty of proving liability will depend on whether autonomous vehicle 
manufacturers include event data recorders within the vehicles.382  If they do, the 
difficulty of proving liability may not be substantially greater than under the current 
automobile system, but proof of liability will still require technical expertise.  If event 
data recorders are not included, proving liability, both causation and negligence, will 
be substantially more difficult than under the current system.  
 
(4) The social utility of the proliferation of autonomous vehicles is great.383  Much of this 
increased social utility results from the dramatic decline in the frequency of accidents, 
but other social benefits will include the ability of children and disabled persons to 
travel in such vehicles without an able-bodied adult present, greater density of traffic 
(thus requiring fewer roads and travel lanes), and greater convenience.  
 
The difficulties of proving that any particular party within the autonomous vehicle 
system, including the manufacturers of the vehicles, operators of the infrastructure, software 
engineers, or drivers of the vehicles, caused an accident and engaged in tortious conduct (e.g., 
the product was defective) suggest some form of collective liability for the purpose of 
compensating personal injury victims.384  Manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and those 
responsible for designing, building, and maintaining the infrastructure would be assessed to 
provide the compensation pool from which injured victims will be compensated.  Witt notes that 
workers’ compensation is really a system that dispenses with proof of factual causation as well 
as fault,385 and the same principle would apply here.   
                                                          
379 See supra notes 354-355, and accompanying text.  
380 See supra note 356 and accompanying text 
381 See supra note 357 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra note 371 and accompanying text. 
383 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 5-6. 
384 See Vladeck, supra note 343, at 146 (proposing a strict liability, “court-compelled insurance regime”).  
385 See supra note 330.  
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The principal distinction between a strict liability and a no-fault system is whether the 
liability system is administered by common law courts in which juries typically determine 
damages or no-fault administrative agencies where damages are limited and typically do not 
include compensation for noneconomic damages.  As was the case during the nineteenth century, 
the expected high social utility of autonomous vehicles is relevant to the choice between a 
common-law strict liability approach and a no-fault compensation system.  Society may 
legitimately decide that because of the extremely significant overall improvement in safety 
resulting from autonomous vehicles and other positive aspects of autonomous vehicles,386 the 
development of the autonomous-vehicle technology should be subsidized.  The goal of using the 
liability system to subsidize a safer, beneficial transportation system suggests that the task of 
assessing the costs of accidents be withdrawn from common law courts and juries and transferred 
to administrative agencies.  Additionally, this change may be justified because jurors’ 
widespread skepticism about complex technologies and resentment toward corporations that 
promote such technologies might result in unwarranted findings of liability and excessive 
damages.387  
There are contrary arguments that suggest that common law liability should apply to 
autonomous vehicle accidents.388  Some manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and the 
accompanying infrastructure may be less careful in the design and implementation of the 
autonomous vehicle system than others, and the limitations on damages present in no-fault 
compensation systems reduce the incentives to minimize losses.  Proponents of no-fault liability 
                                                          
386 See KALRA ET AL., supra note 347, at 5 (noting advantages of autonomous vehicles for members of the disabled 
and elderly communities).  
387 See Lance Ulanoff, How Trump Won an Election Helped by America’s Anti-Tech Luddites, MASHABLE (Nov. 16, 
2016), http://mashable.com/2016/11/16/trump-tech-vote/#zwBX46T7Lmqi (observing “that tech and innovation 
weren’t necessarily positive terms in the heartland. … Technology wasn’t the answer for these voters because it was, 
essentially, the villain”).  
388 For example, Vladek argues in favor of a “strict liability” regime instead of a no-fault regime.  See Vladeck, 
supra note 343, at 146-48.   He wants the compensation scheme to be administered by common law courts and not 
administrative agencies, and he cites recent studies showing that automobile no-fault compensation systems have not 
reduced transaction costs as their proponents originally anticipated.  See Vladeck, supra note 343, at 147 n.91.    
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would rely on regulatory agencies and market pressures to provide the incentives to minimize 
accidents, but this has not always proven to be a safe assumption.389 
To be effective, a no-fault liability system for autonomous vehicles would require 
congressional enactment.  Common law courts could not adopt any system that limited the 
damages received by victims.  Any attempt by a state legislature to enact a no-fault 
compensation system would not be effective in creating a subsidy to encourage the development 
of an autonomous-vehicle network.  Manufacturers operate in a national marketplace and their 
vehicles travel across state borders, subjecting manufacturers to liability in states that have not 
enacted no-fault compensation systems.390  During the past half-century, a well-organized 
plaintiff’s bar vigorously fought the adoption of no-fault compensation systems in virtually all 
contexts in which they were proposed.391  Lawsuits arising from automobile accidents are the 
bread-and-butter of the vast majority of plaintiffs’ counsel,392 and thus it is unlikely that their 
opposition would be anything other than fierce.  
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
389 See generally RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, 
AND THREATS TO HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2010) (explaining how regulatory failures have 
afflicted health, safety, and environmental programs government-wide due to budget shortfalls, outdated authorizing 
statutes, and lack of political support from the White House and Congress). 
390 A state that declines to enact a no-fault liability system with limited damages for accidents caused by autonomous 
vehicles, while other states do so in an effort to subsidize autonomous-vehicle technology, would prevent the other 
states from realizing the benefits of subsidization. See Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical 
Analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 78 (2003); cf. Kassel v. Consol. 
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981) (illustrating how one state’s exercise of its police powers that differs 
from that of most other states interferes with interstate commerce and hence violates the Commerce Clause); Bibb v. 
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 528 (1959) (discussing how conflicting exercises of states’ police powers create 
a “massive … burden on interstate commerce”). 
391 See THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 103–41, 171–89 (2002) (describing the success of the California Trial Lawyers Association in blocking no-
fault legislation); Jeffrey O’Connell & Robert H. Joost, Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-fault 
Insurance, 72 VA. L. REV. 61, 75 (1986) (describing opposition of trial lawyers to no-fault plans).    
392 Cf. Sarah Parikh & Bryant Garth, Philip Corboy and the Construction of the Plaintiffs’ Personal Injury Bar, 30 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 269, 271 n.1 (2005) (noting that “[t]he majority of Chicago plaintiffs’ lawyers handle a high 
volume of smaller cases—mostly automobile accidents”); Charles Silver, Preliminary Thoughts on the Economics of 
Witness Preparation, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383, 1384 (1999) (describing automobile accidents as “the bread and 
butter of the typical plaintiff’s attorney.”).  
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Legal historians and tort scholars have failed to pay sufficient attention to the primary 
role played by technological change in the law governing compensation for personal injuries.  
The first great transformation of American tort law, the adoption of the negligence regime, 
occurred during the mid-nineteenth century when courts for the first time faced numerous claims 
from victims of personal injuries caused by post-Industrial Revolution machinery, particularly 
railroads.393   
The second major set of changes in American accident compensation law, which I regard 
as delayed aftershocks of the Industrial Revolution, began when most workplace injuries were 
removed from the common law tort system and handled within the separate workers’ 
compensation system.394  Once again, the impacts of technology on the economy, here the 
development of the factory system and the proliferation of railroads and other industrial 
machinery, contributed to the change.395  Within decades, the proliferation of the automobile 
culture and the mass injuries it produced resulted in the formal enactment of workers’-
compensation-type no-fault systems in a minority of states.  Moreover, in most states, the 
negligence regime remained nominally intact, but now functioned more like a no-fault system 
than the traditional negligence regime.396  Finally, during the 1960s and 1970s, the mass 
consumer society appeared to result in another important change in American tort law, the 
adoption of strict products liability.397  Over the longer term, however, this change in the law 
turned out to be more apparent than real.398  
From this history, in this Article I derive a descriptive model for analyzing and predicting 
what changes in accident compensation law will result from the adoption of new technologies.  
The model suggests that changes in tort law will follow from technology-caused changes in the 
                                                          
393 See supra notes 65–92, 126–147, 153–159, 190–202, and accompanying texts.  
394 See supra notes 218–230, and accompanying text. 
395 See supra notes 213–217, and accompanying text. 
396 See supra notes 265–278, and accompanying text. 
397 See supra notes 288–295, and accompanying text. 
398 See supra notes 305–320, and accompanying text. 
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following four variables: (1) the frequency of accident injuries resulting from the new 
technology, (2) the severity of injury resulting from the technological innovations, (3) the 
difficulty facing the claimant in proving the prerequisites of liability, and (4) the social utility of 
the new technology.  
Society is now in the early phases of a technological revolution that will rival the 
Industrial Revolution in importance, one involving robots, artificial intelligence, and, most 
importantly, autonomous vehicles.399  During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, post-
Industrial-Revolution machines replaced the power and force previously supplied by human 
beings and horses.  Now machines are replacing the decision-making previously supplied by 
humans.400   
Application of the model’s factors to autonomous vehicles suggests the adoption of either 
a no-fault system or a strict, collective liability standard within the common law that requires 
proof of neither fault nor individual causation as a requirement of liability.  The choice between 
these two alternatives should be made on the basis of two factors: (1) the extent to which we trust 
administrative regulation to assure an adequate level of attention to safety consideration in the 
development of an autonomous vehicle system, and (2) the need to subsidize the development of 
the autonomous vehicle system that offers great positive social utility.  Regardless of the choice, 
the next technology-inspired revolution in American tort law looms on the horizon.  
                                                          
399 See supra notes 347–353, and accompanying text. 
400 See supra notes 342–343, and accompanying text. 
